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“The Senate of the United States is the only legislative body in the world which cannot act when 
its majority is ready for action.”1 
 
 
Woodrow Wilson 
President of the United States (1913-1921) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 Lindsey Rogers, The American Senate, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1926), 116. 
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I. 
Introduction 
 
 
 For over 125 years, from the ratification of the Constitution to the passage of the Seventeenth 
Amendment in 1913, the voting public did not elect U.S. senators. Instead, as a result of careful 
planning by the Founding Fathers, state legislatures alone possessed the authority to elect two 
senators to represent their respective interests in Washington. It did not take long for second and third 
generation Americans to question the legitimacy of this process. Elections for senators often resulted 
in legislative deadlocks, in which partisan sentiment prevented agreement on a single candidate 
within the state assemblies. Bribery and corruption also became common cries of complaint, as 
evidence mounted that state officials profited from the scheme by selling their senate votes to 
corporations and other vested interests. The problem of officials voting for themselves led to the 
troubling multiplication of candidates by the turn of the century. When North Carolina’s Legislature 
convened to elect a U.S. senator in 1903, eighty-five legislators put their names up for selection.2 In 
Delaware, due to an absence of a majority vote, the state slugged its way through twenty-four months 
with no senators at all.3 To many observers, the system was in need of reform, but the stimulus for a 
popular elections amendment was controversial and not inevitable. This essay examines why reform 
came in 1911 with the Senate’s unexpected passage of the Seventeenth Amendment, which was 
ratified twenty-four months later in the first year of Woodrow Wilson’s presidency. 
 Beginning in 1826, various proposals were suggested in Congress to enhance the election 
procedure. Congressional debate on the subject remained desultory for decades, however, until the 
1890s when petitions from political associations and citizens began flooding Congress with calls for 
                                                 
2
 George Haynes, The Senate of the United States: Its History and Practice, Vol. I (New York: Russell & 
Russell, 1938), 83.  
3
 57th Congress. ibid, 66. 
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reform.4 State legislatures perceived the problem of indirect elections to be so severe that over two-
thirds formally pledged their support for an amendment giving the voting public the right to elect 
U.S. senators by 1900.5 They lamented the rampant corruption that plagued the indirect procedure, 
and demanded reform to end the troubling legislative deadlocks.6 The House responded to these pleas 
by passing five affirmative proposals to that end in 1893, 1894, 1898 (unanimously), 1900, and 1902, 
but the Senate doggedly blocked these measures.7 Had the Senate been less obstinate, therefore, an 
amendment for popular elections could have been passed much earlier – in the late 1890s perhaps – 
since the measure had sufficient support in the House and states. Instead, it would take many years of 
bitter ideological disputes, political legerdemain, institutional obstacles, and even an explosive 
sectional rift over race, before the measure’s ratification. 
 The burden of delay rested on the shoulders of the ninety senators who owed their prized 
Senate seats to their state legislatures. As early as 1896, the New York Times wrote that ‘opposition is 
now confined to the Senate.’8 In 1902, the New York Times decried the Senate as ‘the principal 
obstacle’ to direct elections, while celebrating the House for its work.9 And in 1905, the Senate 
continued to be ‘immovable’ and as ‘fossilized as ever’ in regard to popular elections for senators.10 
Members of the Upper Chamber recognized, rightly, that the amendment jeopardized their chances of 
reelection. Many depended on a coterie of legislative supporters for their seats and stood little chance 
                                                 
4
 William Riker, ‘The Senate and American Federalism’ in The American Political Science Review, Vol. 49, 
No. 2. (Jun., 1955), 467. 
5
 The Senate was not moved either by the startling realization in 1900 that state legislatures would likely ratify 
a proposed direct elections amendment by the necessary three-quarters majority. According to the Los Angeles 
Times, there was ‘not much doubt that state legislatures would ratify the amendment by the necessary three-
quarters majority.’ (‘A Significant Vote’, April 6, 1900 p. 8). Another article noted that it would ‘probably not 
be difficult to secure the ratification by the state legislatures.’ (‘Electing U.S. Senators’, Los Angeles Times, 
Sept. 15, 1906 p. II4). 
6
 C.H. Hoebeke, The Road to Mass Democracy: Original Intent and the Seventeenth Amendment, (New 
Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1995), 83.  
7
 The 1894 vote was ayes 137, nays 49; the 1900 vote was ayes 240, nays 15. See: ‘Senators by Popular Vote’, 
New York Times, July 22, 1894 p. 1 and ‘To Amend the Constitution’, New York Times, April 14, 1900 p. 5, as 
well as Riker, 467. 
8
 ‘The Senate and the People’, New York Times, June 9, 1896 p. 2. 
9
 ‘Election of Senators’, Los Angeles Times, June 24, 1902 p. 5.  
10
 ‘The Changing Order of Things in the Senate’, New York Times, Nov. 8, 1908 p. SM4. 
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of winning a popular contest. ‘It is much easier for a pushing and plotting politician… who has a 
good deal of power over a party machine to secure nomination in a legislative caucus than the 
support of a majority of the people’, noted the New York Times.11 ‘The President, House of 
Representatives and Supreme Court are in line with the people, while the only branch of government 
which is obstructing their will is the Senate’,12 lamented the Wall Street Journal in 1906. Five years 
later, the Senate became the first institution to ratify the Seventeenth Amendment. What changed? 
 The Senate’s volte-face occurred rapidly and unexpectedly.13 In the haphazard context 
underlying its passage, a number of developments surprised contemporaries and confounded 
scholars.14 It is not intuitive, for instance, why the state legislatures vigorously sought to cede their 
most potent check on the federal government – their right to choose U.S. senators; more perplexing is 
why senators who were voted in by state officials voluntarily agreed to popular elections, a change 
that spelled the political suicide for many of these very senators.15 Other questions have not been 
satisfactorily answered by scholarship to this day. Among published materials, it remains a mystery 
why the amendment was passed first by the Senate, instead of the House, and why the Upper 
Chamber did so precisely in 1911 – as opposed to an earlier or later date.  
After analyzing the relevant scholarship, the Congressional Record, and contemporary 
newspaper accounts, I have found a depth of heretofore unpublished research powerfully illustrating 
that a convergence in rapid succession of four factors from 1908 to 1911 made the previously 
political issue of direct elections into an urgent question of national importance. This evidence 
                                                 
11
 Some senators refused to support direct elections because they ‘could never have obtained their seats if they 
had depended upon popular support. (‘Election of Senators by the People’, New York Times, April 13, 1892 p. 
4). As Representative Bushnell remarked in 1892, ‘Men have gained seats in the senate of the United State 
whom the people of their state would never have chosen’ (Bybee, 539). 
12
 ‘Supreme Court and Senate’, Wall Street Journal, Feb. 6, 1906, p. 1. 
13
 President Wilson’s remarks are telling in this regard. When learning of the amendment’s ratification, he 
said: ‘I am sincerely glad the amendment has been ratified so promptly and a reform so long fought for has at 
last been accomplished’ (‘Elect Senators by Direct Vote’, Los Angeles Times, April 9, 1913, p. 4). 
14
 ‘Decline of the Senate’, Wall Street Journal, Aug. 24, 1905 p. 1.  
15
 As the New York Times observed: ‘To ask the legislatures to ratify the amendment is to ask them to strip 
themselves of power conferred upon them from the beginning’ (‘Senators by Direct Vote’, June 14, 1911 p. 8).  
 6 
demonstrates the Seventeenth Amendment became suddenly perceived as not only sufficient, but also 
necessary, and that its path to ratification similarly crossed a permissive threshold at this time. The 
four factors – a sensational Senate scandal of unprecedented magnitude involving Mr. Lorimer of 
Illinois,16 a vigorous campaign to end ineffective state primary laws by state governors, a racially-
tinged states’ rights controversy, and the death and retirement of four powerful and conservative 
senators – propelled the passage of the Seventeenth Amendment by the Senate on June 12, 1911. A 
fifth factor of a more amorphous nature was also significant, although less important: the country’s 
movement toward Progressivism and calls for reform at all levels of government.17  
In the absence of these factors, my research illustrates, popular elections for senators would 
not have occurred in the Progressive Era, or perhaps at all. As late as August 1905, the Wall Street 
Journal noted, ‘We do not believe that it is possible for a long time to secure the adoption of the 
[Seventeenth] Amendment.’18 ‘The Senate will never willingly allow such an amendment’, balked 
the Los Angeles Times the same year.19 In 1906, the newspaper reported regarding the Senate, ‘On its 
initiative, it will never propose, nor will it allow to pass’ an enactment of electoral reform.20 Thus, 
contingency mattered to the Seventeenth Amendment. This empirical finding is supported by a 
breadth of previously unpublished material; through the use of Proquest,21 I have individually 
searched for, analyzed, and synthesized no fewer than 1,400 newspaper articles, of which exactly 232 
                                                 
16
 Hoebeke, 92.  
17
 As the New York Times noted in 1908: ‘the old order is changing, yielding place to new… A great change is 
coming over… (‘The Changing Order of Things in the Senate’). David Brady, Richard Brody, and David 
Epstein write: ‘The turning point in the development of the modern congress occurred in the period from 1896-
1910. During that period, called the ‘big bang’ by Polsby, being a member of Congress became a career… 
seniority became the norm in making committee and chairman assignments, and the rules were changed so that 
committees rather than parties became the major policy actor… The system became decentralized after 1910, 
when party and committee leadership positions were separated’ (205). See: Brady,Brody, Epstein, 
“Heterogeneous Parties and Political Organization: The U.S. Senate, 1880-1920” in Legislative Studies 
Quarterly, Vol. 14, No. 2 (May, 1989). 
18
 ‘Decline of the Senate’, Wall Street Journal, Aug. 24, 1905 p. 1. 
19
 ‘Election of Senators’, Los Angeles Times,  July 5, 1905 p. II4. 
20
 ‘Election of U.S. senators by Popular Vote’, Los Angeles Times, Feb. 5, 1906 p. 6. 
21
 Proquest allows for simultaneous searching of the New York Times, Los Angeles Times, Chicago Defender, 
Pittsburg Courrier, Wall Street Journal, and a number of prominent periodicals. Its content is estimated at 125 
billion digital pages. www.proquest.com/en-US/default.shtml. 
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are footnoted in this paper. (For a detailed explanation of the content analysis of this paper, please 
see the Appendix following the Conclusion.) 
Timing in political science is a perpetually difficult phenomenon to understand, but it forms 
the motivations of this essay. Scholars have long underplayed the question of the amendment’s 
timing, and, by focusing on long-standing factors instead, have exacerbated attempts to 
systematically understand its immediate origins.22 William Riker, for example, inadequately 
attributes the amendment to state pressure: ‘Three-quarters of the states had indicated they no longer 
wanted to elect senators… The Senate concurred because there was little point in holding out any 
longer.’23 This assessment is untenable: since precisely the same number of states had made this 
intention clear for over a decade, why was it only in 1910 that the amendment became clearly 
foreseen?24 Other accounts stress the deep-seated factor of public opinion. ‘In the final analysis,’ 
concluded an article in the Northwestern Law Review in 1995, ‘the real justification for the 
amendment was its populist appeal… The people simply wished to elect senators themselves’.25 The 
academic consensus continues to be, in the words of Jay Bybee, that ‘the populist movement was 
hard to ignore.’26 This theory also lacks explanatory power. ‘The prevailing sentiment of the 
American people’ had been by 1902 ‘undoubtedly in favor of direct elections’, the Los Angeles 
Times reported.27 Not dismissive of this argument, George Haynes, the doyen of the Senate, stresses 
three factors: state pressure (like Riker), public opinion (like Bybee), and legislative deadlocks.28 I 
am somewhat persuaded by Haynes’s multi-factorial explanation, as these three dynamics most 
                                                 
22
 As Bybee has noted, by the early 1890s, there was a general perception that senatorial elections had been 
bought and sold (540). Also see: Hoebeke, 83. 
23
 Riker, 468. Emphasis added. 
24
 As mentioned above, thirty-one states had expressed their desire for a Constitutional amendment by 1904; in 
six years, this number only grew to thirty-three states. The two additional states memorials were an 
insignificant force driving the Senate’s volte-face. See: Robert Byrd, The Senate 1789-1989: Addresses on the 
History of the United States Senate, Vol. I (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1988), 398. 
25
 Bybee, 538. Emphasis added. 
26
 ibid, 544. 
27
 ‘Election of Senators’, Los Angeles Times, June 24, 1902 p. 5. 
28
 George Haynes, The Election of Senators (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1906). 
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clearly combined to motivate reform. But I am not interested in merely understanding the 
justifications for the Seventeenth Amendment, as scholars have emphasized, but identifying stimuli 
that drove Congress to support the measure.  
It is highly unlikely that the breaking-point occurred before 1908 given that one-third of the 
legislatures voted for a U.S. senator every two years; it was only in 1910 – not 1908, 1906, 1904, or 
1902, etc. – that ten new progressive senators replaced incumbents.29 It is my belief that sentiments 
aroused at this time largely lay dormant before that election, meaning that agitation for the 
amendment was not perceived as urgent until after 1908. Authors have argued that the critical years 
came long before this date. James Sopp writes that ‘the figurative feather that broke the back of the 
Senate’s reputation was a series of articles’ by the famous muckraking journalist, David Phillips, in 
1906.30 Other scholars go further back. Riker argues that the agitation for direct elections reached its 
high point during the 52nd Congress in 1891-92, which received seven state memorials, 54 petitions, 
and 24 resolutions on the subject.31  
 Newspaper coverage, however, reinforces the notion that the watershed moment occurred at a 
later date. Headlines covering issues relevant to direct elections, as measured by frequency, reached 
an incomparable climax in 1910-11 (according to my research); the year 1910, for instance, featured 
more than ten times the articles related to direct elections than did the year 1905.32 Other issues, such 
as reduction of tariffs, the silver issue, and foreign treaties, captured the interest of officials and the 
                                                 
29
 In the 61st Congress, the Senate featured 60 Republicans and 32 Democrats; the 62nd Congress revealed a 
ratio of 51 Republicans and 43 Democrats. See: Lawrence Chamberlain, The President, Congress and 
Legislation, (New York: AMS Press, Inc., 1967), 110. 
30
 James Sopp, Indirect Elections and the Democratization of the United States Senate: Constitutional Design, 
Historical Development, Roll Call Voting, and the Outcome of National Elections, (Doctoral Thesis, 
University of Illinois, 1999), 89.  
31
 Riker, 467. 
32
 I have found 253 articles with direct relevance to the stimulus in 1910, and 254 articles for 1911. By 
contrast, coverage of the issue was perceptibly lower earlier in the decade. I found only 25 articles relevant to 
direct elections in 1904 and 32 in 1905. See Appendix for further elaboration. 
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public drastically more than direct elections for most of the period from 1890 to 1911.33 The 
evidence suggests that the defining moment did not spring from a series of editorials from 1906. Nor 
did the high watermark of resentment come in the early 1890s, as Riker has written. The crucial 
developments occurred from 1908 to 1911. It was only at this time that a series of events coalesced to 
convince state legislatures to send fresh blood to the Senate. It was only at this time that the Senate 
itself had changed sufficiently as an institution to allow the amendment to be passed. And it was only 
in this period that one can understand why the Senate passed the amendment before the House.  
To understand the Senate’s orientation at the turn of the twentieth century, it is necessary to 
be familiar with the Founding Father’s desire for indirect elections and how this electoral procedure 
served the antebellum Senate. I will provide this overview in the following section of my thesis, 
which will help establish why the call for popular elections was so controversial. I will also explain 
why the measure was transformative; to this day the Seventeenth Amendment receives mainstream 
media attention for its ramifications regarding vacancies and governor appointments.  
 In the third section, where I get to the heart of my argument, I emphasize the tendency of 
existing scholarship to focus on the justifications for the amendment, as opposed to imminent factors 
precipitating its passage. Pressure for an electoral overhaul was evidenced from an outpouring of 
public support, memorials from legislatures, and muckraking journalists. By showing that these 
factors crystallized in the 1890s in response to rampant bribery, legislative deadlocks, and senatorial 
incompetence as it related to the silver issue, I will to some extent reinforce the secondary literature. 
At the same time, I will substantially add to it by emphasizing the long-standing existence of these 
phenomena, in order to explain that these factors did not convince officials of the necessity for a 
Constitutional amendment. 
                                                 
33
 ‘There are two subjects now foremost before the people of this country’, noted the Wall Street Journal, ‘one 
of these is the question of revision of the tariff. The other is government regulation of corporations.’ (‘The 
Two Factions’, Dec. 10, 1904 p. 1). The New York Times agreed; in the words of Senator Rayner, ‘the tariff 
and executive usurpation are the leading campaign issues’ (‘Calls Roosevelt Usurper’, Aug. 28, 1906, p. 4). 
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 It is in the fourth section that I focus on the U.S. Senate, a comprehensive analysis that to my 
knowledge does not yet exist. This section focuses on the actions and commentaries of the ninety 
senators themselves, as opposed to the previous section which emphasizes out-of-doors pressure. The 
objective is to show that the timing of the Seventeenth Amendment was most powerfully affected by 
factors underplayed, if not obscured, by existing scholarship. By exploring senators’ political 
arguments against direct elections, I show that a very strong case existed for not enacting electoral 
reform. Then, by explaining how procedure rules, such as the use of filibusters and committee 
wrangling, made the Senate uniquely amendable to control of the minority, I show how institutional 
rules impeded the progress of reform. The Seventeenth Amendment would be forced to hurdle over 
these political and institutional stumbling blocks – which would not begin to occur until 1908.  
 I examine the crucial years in the penultimate section of the essay. Beginning with Mr. 
Lorimer, I show how a three-year scandal captivated the nation, radicalized public opinion to an 
unprecedented extent, and convinced legislators that their political futures depended on not only 
passively supporting direct elections through formal petitions but actively supporting progressive 
U.S. Senate candidates. Second, I focus on how an informal collaboration of governors and national 
leaders further galvanized the stimulus. Woodrow Wilson, the governor-elect of New Jersey, and 
William Jennings Bryan, the Democrat candidate for President in 1908, stoked the embers for 
electoral reform, in particular, helping to turn it into an issue of pressing importance.34 The sustained 
effort only began in 1908 because it was at this time that the experiment of state primaries 
(originating on Oregon, 1901) became perceived to be in need of national reform – in order to end 
controversial and ineffective state laws. Third, by shedding light on the dramatic turn the debate took 
with the so-called Sutherland/Bristow resolution, I show how the direct elections stimulus turned into 
an explosive issue of race. Divisive schisms infused the debate with new moral implications, 
                                                 
34
 It was argued at the time that Bryan opportunistically galvanized the direct election cause to increase 
political capital for himself. He is ‘engaging in political buncombe for the necessity of change’, noted the Los 
Angeles Times (‘Wake Up Bill!’, Sept. 6, 1906 p. II4). 
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convincing senators that it was now necessary to pass the measure ‘to preserve the continuity of 
Congress itself.’35 The Sutherland/Bristow clause, reserving the supervision of Senate elections to the 
federal government, passed the Upper Chamber in 1911 but required a year before arms in the House 
could be twisted to support it. The Senate agreed to the resolution long before the House largely 
because of the fourth and final factor prompting the Seventeenth Amendment: the untimely passing 
of Mr. Allison, the Republican leader in the Senate, in 1908, making the Upper Chamber less 
amenable to partisan control. Mr. Allison, a fierce direct elections opponent, had led a powerful 
group of senators, known as ‘The Four’, who dominated the Senate at the turn of the century.36 His 
conservative ally, Mr. Nelson Aldrich, has been called one of the most powerful senators ever to 
serve.37 After Allison’s death, all three of the remaining Four had stepped down or died by 1911, not 
coincidentally, the same year the Seventeenth Amendment passed.  
 In the subsequent section, I explain the fifth, elusive factor: why the atmosphere was ripe for 
reform at the turn of the century. Beginning with the emergence of the Populist Party in the early 
1890s, newly politicized farmers and workers frustrated by the growing disparity of wealth in the 
country mobilized to demand political concessions.38 The presidency of Theodore Roosevelt, who 
has been called America’s first modern chief executive, encapsulated the new spirit of reform.39 The 
Republican Party suffered severe setbacks at this time due to the Depression of 1907, which had not 
lifted with the passage of the 1909 tariff. The 62nd Congress featured eleven new Democratic 
                                                 
35
 ‘Direct Election of Senators Finds Rocky Road in Senate’, AP in Los Angeles Times, Feb. 18, 1911 p. 17. 
36
 Vincent DeSantis, The Shaping of Modern America: 1877-1920, Second Ed., (Arlington Heights, Illinois, 
1989), 175. 
37
 Richard Cohen, Congressional Leadership: Seeking a New Role, Vol. VIII (Beverly Hill, CA: Sage 
Publications, Inc., 1980), 30. 
38
 DeSantis, 153. Also see: Robert McMath, Jr.,  American Populism: A Social History, 1877-1898, (New 
York: Hill and Wang, 1993), 8. 
39
 As Richard Baker writes, ‘Roosevelt’s move into the White House after McKinley’s assassination began the 
modern presidency and one of the greatest periods of reform in the nation’s history’ (68). See: Baker, The 
Senate of the United States: A Bicentennial History, (Malabar, Florida: Robert E. Krieger Publishing 
Company, 1988). 
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senators. This auspicious political framework did not prompt the Seventeenth Amendment (as did 
four previous factors) but its passage would have been impossible without it.  
In my conclusion, I provide several insights as to the amendment’s journey through the 
House and states that have never before been published. The goal, again, is to emphasize 
contingency, in particular during the moments preceding the amendment’s ratification. Even though 
the House was widely expected to embrace a popular elections amendment, it blocked the historic 
Seventeenth Amendment passed by the Senate before it ultimately relented in May of 1912.40 
Idiosyncrasies during the state ratification process further delayed the amendment, which was not 
formally signed into effect until May of 1913. 
Those factors that were the sine qua non of the Seventeenth Amendment’s passage must be 
taken into account. Long-standing factors discussed by previous scholarship cannot explain the 
amendment’s ratification. Literally, for decades, the public demand for electoral reform had been 
‘loud and emphatic’ (1896);41 There is probably not a state that would not endorse it in a popular 
election’, announced the New York Times.42 Yet, not a single proposal for direct election of senators 
managed to squeeze by the Senate until the second half of 1911. Even the House for ten years in the 
early 1900s did not take up the issue. After passing five resolutions for the amendment from 1892-
1902, the House did not pass a single proposal to that end from 1903-11.43 During the early twentieth 
century, public sentiment for other Constitutional amendments was equally boisterous as demands 
for popular election of senators, including abolishing the Electoral College or making the presidency 
one, six-year term.44 These other agitations failed because they lacked what the Seventeenth 
Amendment suddenly gained: a cascade of critical factors prompting its ratification. 
                                                 
40
 Byrd, 402.  
41
 ‘Senators by Popular Vote’, Los Angeles Times, March 21, 1896 p. 2. 
42
 ‘Republican Retreat is Sounded by Bryan’, New York Times, June 21, 1908 p. 2. 
43
 Haynes, Vol. I, 106.  
44
 See Sections VI for an elaboration on these other stimuli. ‘Election of U.S. Senators by Popular Vote’, Los 
Angeles Times, Feb. 5, 1906 p. 6. 
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 By focusing on the Senate’s voting on the stimulus, this essay indicates the extent to which 
legislation in general consists of complicated calculations that often have nothing to do with the 
enactment at hand. At least half of those in the majority on various votes turned out to be opponents 
of direct elections. Their strategy was to pass an amendment so obnoxious to Southern senators who 
otherwise favored direct elections, so that those members would vote against the resolution itself.45 
The thesis, therefore, illustrates a pivotal truth of the workings of Congress: officials often vote in 
antithesis to their individual preferences or misreveal preferences.46 As John Aldrich writes, there are 
invariably in Congress ‘incentives for at least one player… to act strategically or sophisticatedly 
rather than to express preferences sincerely.’47 There exists a growing corpus of theoretical work on 
these so-called ‘killer amendments’, but few historical instances has been documented. As John 
Wilkerson notes, there was ‘a virtual absence of systematic empirical work’ before 1999.48 I will 
show that voting on the Seventeenth Amendment represents an ideal case-study of disingenuous 
strategizing, as the measure’s timing was significantly delayed by ‘killer amendments’. 
 In the following sections, it is important to keep in mind the delineation of boundaries I have 
provided to explicate my argument. Existing scholarship invariably discusses elements which 
encouraged the Seventeenth Amendment, such as public pressure and decades of abuses. Readers of 
this essay, however, will learn in a systematic detail about dynamics which fostered the amendment 
versus those catalysts that ensured its ratification. 
                                                 
45
 Byrd, 400. 
46
 Walter Oleszek writes, ‘Members introduce such bills for a variety of reasons: to go on record in support of 
a given proposal, to satisfy individual constituents or interest groups… to convey message to executive 
agencies, to publicize the issue, to attract media attention, and to fed off criticism during political campaigns’ 
(80). See: Oleszek, Congressional Procedures and the Policy Process (Seventh Ed., Washington, DC: CQ 
Press, 2007). 
47
 John Aldrich writes: ‘Voting is sincere if legislators always vote for whichever alternative they prefer. 
Voting is sophisticated if legislators look ahead to see the consequences of their current votes for later choices. 
One might vote against a preferred alternative to avoid ending up with an even worse outcome’ (301). See: 
Aldrich, Why Parties? The Origin and Transformation of Political Parties in America, (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1995).  
48
 For a review of killer amendments, see: Jeffrey Jenkins and Michael Munger, ‘Investigating the Incidence of 
Killer Amendments in Congress’ in The Journal of Politics, Vol. 65, No. 2 (May, 2003), as well as Wilkerson, 
‘Killer Amendments in Congress’, in The American Political Science Review Vol. 93, No. 3 (Sep., 1999), 532. 
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     Section II: The Seventeenth Amendment in Context 
 
(A).  Research Methodology 
(B).  The Seventeenth Amendment in the 21st Century 
(C).  The Antebellum Senate 
 
 
  
 This section grounds the argument of the thesis in existing scholarship, relevant 
historiography, and germane contemporary notions of the Senate today. It explains why the 
Seventeenth Amendment is fundamentally important to the symmetry of the federal government and 
why it has had an enduring impact on twentieth and twenty-first century political history. And, 
finally, it explains the reasons underpinning a scholarly reappraisal of the amendment.  
 
Section II (A): Research Methodology 
 Why has the storyline of the timing of the Seventeenth Amendment not received the attention 
it deserves? A few answers are telling. The most direct one involves the fact that the Seventeenth 
Amendment has received comparatively little scholarly attention. John Lapinski in 2002 noted that 
‘only a modicum of research has been devoted to what is arguably the most important institutional 
change of the twentieth century involving congressional representation.’49 In The Road to Mass 
Democracy, C.H. Hoebeke wrote (1995): ‘The direct election of U.S. senators has engendered very 
little commentary in the historiography of either the Constitution or of the Progressive Era. It has 
been somewhat summarily adjudged a closed case.’50 James Sopp supported this notion (1999): 
“There has been surprisingly little research done on the Seventeenth Amendment”51, while Ronald 
King and Susan Ellis published an article in the Studies in American Political Development (1996), 
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noting: ‘There have been few academic studies of this amendment.’52 Moreover, scholars have 
tended to focus on the amendment’s effects, as opposed to its origins. In the past two decades, nearly 
all articles on the amendment have focused on its institutional ramifications. John Lapinski 
concluded that ‘Senators did alter their behavior in how they approached committee assignments 
after the Seventeenth Amendment’53; James DeNardo (1994) concluded that direct elections sharply 
increased the responsiveness of the senatorial vote to political tides in the general electorate.54 An 
article in the American Political Science Review (1998) noted: ‘the amendment significantly 
increased the likelihood that a state would send divided delegations to the Senate’55, while Charles 
Stewart (1992) went a long way to disproving that the amendment increased the average size of the 
majority party in the Upper Chamber.56 The latest evaluation appeared in the Journal of Politics 
(2006), concluding that ‘the amendment significantly changed patterns of election-seeking and 
legislative voting behavior.’57 Rather than studying the ramifications of the amendment, or focusing 
on its journey through state legislatures or the House, I examine the factors that fostered its passage 
through the U.S. Senate. 
 The need for a reappraisal also stems from the tendency of scholars to rely on antiquated 
secondary material. Nearly every book or article on the topic relies on the research of George 
Haynes, who published one of his most vaulted books – The Election of Senators – more than a 
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century ago in 1906.58 In the words of Congressional historian, Senator Robert Byrd (the 91-year-old 
President Pro Tempore), Haynes’s work is ‘magnificent’ and although ‘marred by minor errors’, it 
remains ‘an invaluable resource that is yet to be equaled.’59 Unfortunately, the reliance on Haynes’ 
research has led to a regurgitation of scholarly opinion on the Seventeenth Amendment. Since 
academics are primarily concerned with the amendment’s effects, but feel indebted to their readers to 
establish a baseline of understanding with the measure’s origins, they tend to recast the same 
arguments written by a researcher born during Andrew Jackson’s Presidency. In his own award-
winning study, Senator Byrd himself footnotes Haynes twenty-eight times in fewer than fifteen 
pages. Haynes’s book was published in 1906, meaning that the most formative years of the 
Seventeenth Amendment’s journey (1906-1913) are untouched. This thesis goes beyond that 
arbitrary cutoff to examine the amendment from 1890 to the point in time it was ratified. 
 New methodologies are available today that have limited the ability of researchers in the past. 
Thanks to the multi-database search interface known as Proquest, it has been possible to find a great 
deal of evidence that that has never before contributed to published works. I have been able to 
support my argument by a depth of primary sources: newspaper articles that I have individually 
found by searching for factors relevant to direct elections, such as ‘corruption in the Senate’ or 
‘popular election of senators’ over a twenty-two year period beginning in 1890 (for further 
information, see the Appendix). The thrust of this material comes from the New York Times, Los 
Angeles Times, Wall Street Journal, and a few weekly periodicals, including The Forum and The 
Congregationalist. The advantages of journalistic accounts are manifold. They allow for broad 
understanding, with a sense of progress over time, by reporting political events of an official nature, 
as well as developments that are significant to this thesis but only tangentially related to the measure. 
As an example, consider the interest direct elections aroused in the Ivy League, whose college 
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debating teams contested the issue for years. The secondary literature is silent on the trend, which is 
surprising considering scholars’ goal of showing direct elections to be a matter of ‘utmost public 
concern’.60 In fact, as early as 1897, the New York Times reports, Columbia defeated Harvard in a 
debate titled ‘resolved, that the present method of electing U.S. senators is preferable to election by 
popular vote’ – with Harvard holding the affirmative and Columbia the negative. Two years later, 
Harvard debated Yale on the same topic; and as late as 1910 Harvard and Princeton’s debate teams 
disputed the issue of senatorial election and women’s suffrage.61 This information has only recently 
been uploaded. By researching newspapers of diverse ideologies, this thesis breathes fresh air on 
prose long yellowed by decades of neglect.   
 
 
Section II (B): The Seventeenth Amendment in the 21st Century 
 On March 10, 2009, the New York Times published an article on the U.S. Senate that 
harkened back to the debates of one century ago. The controversy is fueled by 2008-09’s flurry of 
tangled appointments to the Senate, which now counts four new members who have yet to face 
election. There was nearly a fifth until one senator changed his mind about departing.62 A group led 
by Senator Russell Feingold, Democrat of Wisconsin, is pushing for a Constitutional change that 
would require that vacancies be filled by popular election. Mr. Feingold said he was motivated by the 
furor surrounding the disputed appointment of Ronald Burris to the Senate by Governor Rod 
Blagojevich of Illinois, but also by the large number of appointees after the election of President 
Obama. ‘I really became troubled when I realized that such a significant percentage of the U.S. 
Senate was about to be appointed rather than elected by the people,’ said Mr. Feingold. 
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 The push for change has sparked interest in the Seventeenth Amendment. The Seventeenth 
Amendment, the article explains, allows for temporary appointments, and in the years since it was 
passed, 185 senators have been appointed in this way.63 Their success in office has been mixed. 
According to the Senate Historical Office, slightly more than one-third were subsequently elected on 
their own, slightly fewer than one-third were defeated, and the remainder chose not to run. Having 
four appointees in one Senate is unusual, but not a record. In 1945-1946, there were more than a 
dozen Senate appointees. The current cluster stems from the resignations of Mr. Obama, Vice-
President Joe Biden, Interior Secretary Ken Salazar, and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. Senator 
Judd Gregg, Republican of New Hampshire, said he would join the cabinet as Commerce Secretary, 
but backed out days later. These appointments have garnered criticisms not only in Illinois, but also 
in New York, where Governor David Peterson publicly vacillated over appointing Caroline Kennedy 
before settling on House member, Kirsten Gillibrand. Even Gregg’s apparent resignation led to a 
strange process in which New Hampshire’s Democratic governor pledged to name a Republican 
replacement to avoid tipping the balance of power in the Senate.  
 It is insightful to see how this modern-day article describes the Seventeenth Amendment. 
Typical of the secondary literature, it provides a stirring appraisal of the effects of the amendment, 
but largely ignores its origins. For instance, it does mention how the Constitution originally required 
senators to be picked by state legislators and that ‘advocates of direct elections first sought to 
overturn the approach as early as 1826.’ But the article does not go beyond that portrayal by 
explaining that the year 1826 was actually significant because a member of Congress, Mr. Henry 
Storrs of New York, was the first official to propose a direct elections amendment.64 The article 
rightly notes that the Seventeenth Amendment was ratified in 1913, but does not mention the 
backdrop to the Amendment’s ratification – how, against expectations, it passed the Senate suddenly, 
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and then the House, and ultimately, the states. The article accurately explains how the amendment 
was helped along by ‘a sensational series of Cosmopolitan magazine stories that explored ties 
between senators and railroad and industrial interests and stirred long-simmering public 
resentment.’65 But this leaves the impression that popular resentment was the primary storyline, and 
fails to note the twists and turns from 1908-11 – as this thesis discusses. The objective of the New 
York Times author may have been limited in scope, but his explicit reference to muckraking and 
‘long-simmering public discontent’, yet simultaneous disregard for any of the four critical factors, 
reflects how gradualism has become a red herring that diverts attention from the true story of the 
amendment’s passage.   
 Among the general populace, the Seventeenth Amendment may not be regarded as a 
particularly defining point in legal history. It is overshadowed by the Bill of Rights and 
Constitutional changes on Prohibition, women’s suffrage, and the Electoral College. Yet, it is 
important to note that the Seventeenth Amendment engendered such controversy that it was 
considered to have the potential to be the ‘wildest and widest revolution… since the Constitution of 
the United States was adopted’, in the words of Senator DePaw in 1902.66 It ‘would amount to the 
destruction of the Senate and the balance of government’, prophesized John R. Passos, the prominent 
attorney, to a conference on the subject in 1908.67 The amendment was not quite so far-reaching, but 
was still a massive change.  
  The Seventeenth Amendment’s impact was momentous even when compared to other 
amendments. The Seventeenth Amendment was the first and only time Congressional election 
procedures were altered. The amendment changed a fundamental compromise from the 
Constitutional Convention. In 1913, the states dealt away their most potent tool – selecting U.S. 
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senators – and did so most willingly and in near record time.68 Indirect elections had been considered 
one of the most important mechanisms by which the states could defend against federal 
encroachment. As Alexander Hamilton noted in The Federalist Papers (#62):  
‘The state legislature, who will always be not only vigilant by suspicious and jealous 
guardians of the rights of the citizens, against encroachments from the Federal 
Government, will constantly have their attention to awake to the conduct of the 
national rulers and will be ready enough, if anything improper appears, to sound the 
alarm to the people and not only to be the VOICE but if necessary the ARM of their 
discontent.’69 
 
With memories of George III in mind, Art. 1, Sec. 3, Cl. 1 of the Constitution – providing ‘The 
Senate of the United States shall be composed of two senators from each state, chosen by the 
legislatures thereof’ – was perceived by federalists and anti-federalists alike to have undeniable 
advantages in protecting against a vigorous executive.  
 By taking elections out of the hands of legislators, the complexion of the U.S. Senate in terms 
of political ideology was transformed. According to the research of Jay Byee, the control of the 
Senate would have returned to the Republicans in 1917, 43 to 53, had the Seventeenth Amendment 
not passed (in reality, Democrats retained control, 54 to 42). In addition, controlling for germane 
factors, without direct elections the Senate would probably have shifted from Democrats to 
Republicans in 1917-1920, 1933-1934, 1945-1946, 1958-1959, and 1981-1986. In other words, 
scholars have noted, major governmental projects in the twentieth century may not have come to 
fruition barring the Seventeenth Amendment; the votes would have been especially lacking to 
support President Roosevelt’s New Deal. Data suggests that for the famous 1994 elections, which 
saw the GOP overtake the Senate for the first time in decades, the Democrats would have retained 
control by a substantial majority of 70 to 30 (directs elections notwithstanding).70  
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 Before the Seventeenth Amendment, only four Constitutional amendments had been passed 
since 1804. Three of these four sailed through at a time of national emergency, on the heels of the 
Civil War, with the Union’s victory largely dictating their passage.71 The Thirteenth Amendment 
(1865) abolished slavery; the Fourteenth Amendment (1868) guaranteed citizenship to black males 
and applied due process to the states; the Fifteenth Amendment (1870) removed race as a condition 
of suffrage. The Sixteenth Amendment, allowing for a federal income tax, was only ratified four 
months before the Seventeenth Amendment. Given the infrequency of amendments, and sweeping 
nature of the reform, the Seventeenth Amendment’s passage was unforeseen before the rapid 
convergence of events from 1908-11. 
  
Section II (C): The Antebellum Senate 
 To fully understand the Seventeenth Amendment, it is necessary to explain why the Senate 
featured indirect elections to begin with. The narrative dates back to the generation that fought the 
Revolutionary War. At the Constitutional Convention in 1787, a proposal for popular elections of 
U.S. senators was, in fact, raised by James Wilson but quickly rejected.72 That the Founding Fathers 
rejected popular elections should not be surprising. The Founders themselves were indirectly elected, 
and the Constitution itself was ratified by state conventions, not by popular vote.73  
 The language of the Constitution illustrates that the Senate was of fundamental importance to 
the delegates, who gave the Senate the notable distinction of an ‘unamendable’ clause. The 
Constitution features two such clauses, also known as ‘Never-Never’ clauses, which establish that 
their provisions are to be valid for all time; no future amendment can override them. One of these 
clauses decreed that the Atlantic slave trade shall be abolished in 1807; the second, contained in 
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Article V, prohibited any change in the equal representation of each state in the Senate.74 In the 
future, opponents of the Seventeenth Amendment would argue the Senate as outlined in the 
Constitution was a sacred institution and should not be tampered with under any circumstance.  
 Indirect elections for senators represented a middle ground upon which the advocates of 
various plans stood together. Divergent opinion ranged all the way from the monarchical notion that 
senators should be chosen by the President of the United States to the democratic idea that they 
should be elected by the people.75 In rejecting the latter proposal, the delegates in 1787 argued that 
the Senate ought to be insulated from the fleeting whims of the electorate. Roger Sherman declared: 
‘The people immediately should have as little to do as may be about government. They lack 
information and are constantly liable to be misled.’76 Elbridge Gerry echoed this theme: ‘The evils 
we experience flow from an excess of democracy. The people do not lack virtue, but are the dupes of 
pretended patriots.’77 Gouverneur Morris believed the second branch out to be composed of an 
‘aristocracy’ whose purpose would be ‘to keep down the turbulence of democracy.’78  
 The advantages of indirect elections seemed just as, if not stronger, than the disadvantages of 
popular elections. Roger Sherman believed indirect elections would be more likely to produce ‘fit 
men’. James Madison thought the Senate ‘ought to come from, and represent, the wealth of the 
nation’. Elbridge Gerry added that ‘commercial and monied interests’ would be ‘more secure in the 
hands of state legislatures, than of the people at large.’79 The 62nd article of the Federalist Papers 
declared that indirect election of senators ensured that, ‘No law or resolution can now be passed 
without the concurrence, first, of a majority of the people, and then of a majority of the states.’80 The 
anti-federalist George Mason explained, ‘The national legislature [would] swallow up the legislatures 
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of the states. The protection from this occurrence [would] be the securing to the state legislatures the 
choice of the senators of the United States.’81 Thus, when Richard Spaight of North Carolina 
proposed that the Upper Chamber be chosen indirectly, his proposal was seconded by John 
Dickinson, and endorsed.82 The ratifying conventions of the states do not appear to have had serious 
objections to this method of election. According to James Madison, the method was ‘most congenial 
with the public opinion.’83 
 The Senate rose in repute to become more prestigious than the House in the antebellum 
period. Upon traveling to America in the late 1820s, Alexis de Tocqueville was struck by the 
differences between the two bodies, and attributed the superior performance of the Senate to indirect 
elections. ‘A couple of paces away [from the House] is the entrance to the Senate, whose narrow 
precincts contain a large proportion of the famous men of America,’ he noted in Democracy in 
America (1835). ‘There is scarcely a man to be seen there whose name does not recall some recent 
claim to fame. They are eloquent advocates, distinguished generals, wise magistrates, and noted 
statesmen. Every word uttered in this assembly would add luster to the greater parliamentary debaters 
in Europe.’84 Tocqueville could think of no reason underlying the distinction of the Senate except 
‘the election which produces the House of Representatives is direct, whereas the Senate is subject to 
election in two stages.’ Other foreign observers concurred. Harriet Martineau, the prolific English 
writer who visited America in 1834, wrote regarding the Senate: ‘The stamp of originality was 
impressed upon every one, and inspired a deep, involuntary respect.’85 John Stuart Mill asserted that 
indirect elections have ‘proved eminently successful; and are conspicuously the best of all the 
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elections in the United States… consisting of the most distinguished men.’86 William Gladstone 
added to the Senate’s accolades, calling it ‘that most remarkable body, the most remarkable of all the 
inventions of modern politics.’87 
 The antebellum Senate was arguably the most esteemed legislative body in the world.88 The 
four-decade period preceding the Civil War is considered to have been the Senate’s ‘Golden Age’. In 
the words of Senate historian Richard A. Baker, it was in this period that the Senate ‘moved from a 
position of relative equality with the House of Representatives and the Presidency to a preeminent 
position.’89 Nearly half of the antebellum presidents – seven of fifteen – served in the institution.  As 
of 1816, the Senate was still widely regarded as a rather inconsequential body, however. In 1789 
through 1809, the House led the Senate in national newspaper coverage by twenty-three to one; in 
1809 through 1829, by four to one.90 Coverage equalized in 1829 largely through the increasing part 
the Senate played in the admission of new territories and states, as well as the rising stardom of 
several senators, including Charles Sumner, John Calhoun, Daniel Webster, and Henry Clay. The 
Senate debates of the Compromise of 1850 have been called ‘the most famous in the history of 
Congress.’91 Generations of schoolchildren recited the famous Senate speeches of the debate. ‘I wish 
to speak today, not as a Massachusetts man, nor as a Northern man, but as an American,’ declared 
Daniel Webster. ‘I speak today for the preservation of the Union. Hear me for my cause.’92  The 
Golden Age of the Senate and the brink of disunion shielded issues associated with indirect 
representation. At the country’s centennial, few observers could have imagined the frenzied agitation 
on the horizon. 
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Section III.     Gradual Pressure 
(A).  Corruption, Bribery, and Legislative Deadlocks 
(B).  Popular Support, State Pressure, and Muckraking Journalism 
 
 
 The previous section contextualized the Seventeenth Amendment in historical and 
contemporary notions regarding the U.S. Senate. This section focuses on the agitation which sought 
to overturn the principle of indirect elections established by the Founding Fathers. Based on my 
research, this agitation grew vigorously starting in the 1890s, only growing irrepressible from 1908-
11. The objective of the section is to support the notion that scholars’ focus on long-standing factors 
is not helpful, and in fact harmful, to explaining the Senate’s volte-face. 
 
Section III (A).  Corruption, Bribery, and Legislative Deadlocks 
 At the turn of the twentieth century, the Senate was widely regarded to be at its nadir both in 
terms of its reputation and performance.93 As the secondary literature discusses, the Senate’s fall into 
disrepute was caused mainly by its association with bribery, corruption, and legislative deadlocks. 
My research also indicates that another dynamic, the Senate’s incompetent response to the silver 
issue, stimulated the call for popular elections. These factors fanned the fames of discontent over 
indirect elections but did not ensure the passage of a Constitutional amendment.  
 Corruption and bribery have been traditionally emphasized as the smoking guns demolishing 
indirect elections. ‘There was a general perception that senatorial elections had been bought and 
sold’, notes Bybee.94 Certainly, the Senate gave the impression that it was the stronghold of trusts 
and corporate interests.95 New senatorial scandals seemed to crop up every year. In 1891, for 
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instance, the New York Times dubbed the California assembly ‘the Legislature of a Thousand 
Scandals’.96 Three years later, the New York Times alleged that $50,000, and perhaps as much as 
twenty times that, had been offered to two senators to kill a tariff reform bill.97  The former Secretary 
of Treasury Charles Fairchild exclaimed that the rumors may not be true but still showed ‘the 
possibilities of corruption in the government.’98 That same year, the president of a powerful sugar 
corporation openly admitted that he hoped ‘to control the legislation of Congress with a view of 
protecting the interests of the trust.’99 In 1905, John Mitchell of Oregon earned the dubious 
distinction of becoming the first senator in history to be sentenced and convicted (and to this day 
remains one of only five sitting senators to have been convicted, along with Ted Stevens of Alaska in 
2008).100 He was found guilty of a shady business transaction, ordered to pay a fine, and sentenced to 
six months in prison; the scandal died, however, as the 70-year-old senator passed away before his 
expulsion.101  
 The Senate’s reputation as a ‘paradise of millionaires’ further damaged its stock in the 
public’s eyes. 102 The old joke went that it was harder for a poor man to enter the Upper Chamber 
than for a rich man to enter Heaven.103 And a story circulating the streets painted President Grover 
Cleveland in his bed at night, with his wife, when she suddenly turned to him, waking him, “Honey, 
there are robbers in the house!” Letting out a sigh of relief, Cleveland replied: “Dear, there are no 
robbers in the house; all of the thieves are in the Senate.”104 By the early 1890s, it was widely 
perceived that the Senate had degenerated from a body of honorable statesmen to a collection of 
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‘boodlers and an aggregation of corporate representatives’.105 A New York Times article in 1890 
observed that a millionaire could purchase a vacant Senate seat, just as ‘he would buy an opera box, 
or a yacht, or any other luxury which he can afford to indulge himself.’106 The ‘chief objection’ to 
indirect election of senators, noted an article in 1899, was the ease with which the seats could be 
purchased.107 Transatlantic commentaries worsened the image of the Senate in this regard. London’s 
Spectator asserted in 1900 that the U.S. Senate ‘now swarms with millionaires who are believed to 
purchase their election by large gifts to campaign funds.’108 And a West Virginia race for a U.S. 
Senate seat attracted negative attention in 1902 when it was acknowledged that all three candidates 
were millionaires.109 It was not long after that the Wall Street Journal wrote: ‘There can be no doubt 
that the Senate has declined in public regard and confidence to a very large extent.’110  
 In addition to the ill-will engendered by corporate influences and bribery, the Senate by the 
1890s had stooped from its lofty plateau due to legislative deadlocks in the state assemblies. Here, 
again, the scholarship discusses the long history of the issue, a fact that clearly led to calls for reform 
but does not explain the timing of a Constitutional amendment. A typical approach in this context is 
for the secondary material to begin with the year 1866, when Congress passed a law requiring state 
legislatures to choose senators by majority vote, rather than plurality vote.111 It is stated, rightly, that 
this law backfired. It led to an even greater number of deadlocks. Mr. Fessenden’s experience 
became frequent. Maine’s Senate elected him eighteen times in the span of several months to become 
U.S. Senator, but the lower house refused to concur, and hence the seat remained vacant throughout 
that Congress.112 In Delaware in 1895, the number of days of deadlocks was 114 with 217 ballots 
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cast, and no senator ended up being elected. The chart below summarizes significant deadlocks 
encountered by nine states in a ten-year period from 1892 to 1901, whereby each state went months 
with only one or sometimes no senators. 
Year   State 
           1892  Louisiana 
           1893  Montana, Utah, Wyoming 
           1894  - 
           1895  Delaware 
           1896  Kentucky 
           1897  Oregon 
           1898  - 
           1899  Delaware, California, Pennsylvania 
           1900  - 
1901 Delaware (two)113 
 
 
These serious deadlocks occurred decades before the passage of the Seventeenth Amendment, and 
therefore cannot be considered a proximate cause. Nonetheless, vacancies were problematic and 
perhaps unconstitutional. As Representative Corliss noted, ‘The framers of the our Constitution did 
not intend to permit vacancies to exist in the Senate.’114  
 Another long-simmering problem with indirect elections stemmed from the multiplication of 
candidates. When North Carolina’s Legislature convened to elect a U.S. senator in 1903, eighty-five 
legislators put their names up for selection.115 In the elections of 1899, twenty-seven candidates were 
voted for in Delaware, twenty-one in Montana, twenty in Utah, seventeen in Pennsylvania, and 
sixteen in Nebraska.116 Perhaps the most eyebrow-raising feature of these deadlocks, however, was 
their tendency to turn violent. Passions ran so high during a Kentucky election in 1896, for instance, 
that the governor declared martial law, calling in the state militia for three days, to minimize the risk 
of bloodshed.117 The Missouri election in 1905 occurred in the midst of a riot. One senator grabbed a 
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ladder, which had been resting by a large clock on the wall, and threw it out the window in disgust; a 
bloody fist fight ensued. Ink bottles were thrown and desks torn from the floor.118 In a controversial 
1903 Colorado race, Republican state leaders appealed to the governor for troops to support their 
candidate, since it was believed that the Democrats had the Denver police on their side.119 The cost to 
the states in money due to these deadlocks or in the derangement of public affairs was an expensive 
luxury. A meeting of the Tennessee Legislature to fill a deceased U.S. Senator in 1898 lasted from 
January 17 to February 5, and is estimated to have cost the state $20,000.120 That is to say nothing of 
the recrimination which accrued over the contests.  
 These legislative deadlocks are instructive as to the timing of the Seventeenth Amendment. 
Notably, the worst excesses of the deadlocks occurred in the 1890s, not in the immediate years 
preceding its passage. Martial law was declared in Kentucky in 1896, for instance, not 1908 or 1910; 
Delaware went without any senators in 1901, not 1907 or 1909. A poignant remark to this point was 
implicitly offered by Senator Hanna, when he remarked that an amendment for direct elections ‘will 
be encouraged by obstinate deadlocks in the Senate.’121 Legislative deadlocks, in other words, made 
electoral reform more likely, but not inevitable. As early as 1902, it was clear to many commentators 
that the compromised ability of legislatures to elect senators was demonstrated ‘conclusively’ by 
deadlocks.122 It would take another nine years before the Senate concurred to alter the Constitution.  
 A subtheme of this paper is to note errors in the secondary material or to shed light on 
germane evidence not previously identified. Such an opportunity arises with the Senate’s tangled 
action on the silver issue in the 1890s. While the scholarship discusses at length entrenched 
corruption and deadlocks, it fails to detect agitation rooted in the attitude of the Senate on the repeal 
of the Silver Purchase Law of 1893, which ‘stimulated the demand for direct popular control of the 
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election of members of the Upper Branch’, according to the Congregationalist periodical.123 With a 
decline in personnel, the Senate passed aggravating laws in the face of economic crises. In 1878, for 
instance, it overid a presidential veto requiring the treasury to coin from two to four million worth of 
bullion into dollars, the market value of which at the time was only a little more than 90 cents. Again 
in the early 1890s, when silver in the standard dollar had depreciated in value far below the level of 
1878, the Senate by a great majority declared in favor of unrestricted coinage – a policy out of touch 
with public sentiment.124 The unpleasant truth regarding the silver issue was that the Senate is 
‘making a parliamentary ass of itself’, declared the New York Times in 1893.125 The economic 
performance of the Senate, lamented another article in 1895, has been ‘lame and impotent’ and 
‘ignoble’.126 When considering the justifications for the amendment, it is worth recalling that specific 
economic policies of the Senate in the 1890s prompted calls for reform – not only government 
malfeasance. State legislatures appeared increasingly ill-equipped to send talented men to Congress. 
 The character of the Senate had deteriorated from the time of Webster and Clay. The 
introduction of new states was seen to have lowered the caliber of the Senate.127 An article from the 
New York Times in 1897 called the new senators from the West ‘bores’ and reminisced about ‘the 
great men of the earlier time’.128 While these lamentations illustrated frustration with indirect 
elections, their existence two decades before the Seventeenth Amendment passed indicates that the 
critical years had yet to occur. 
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Section III (B).  Popular Support, State Pressure, and Muckraking Journalism 
 
 Popular pressure began to crystallize in the 1890s to alter the Constitution. The resentment of 
the electorate towards indirect elections was supplemented by a surge in state resolutions declaring 
steadfast commitment for reform. Muckraking journalism fanned the flames of discontent as well, 
most notably David Graham Phillips’s articles in Cosmopolitan magazine in 1906. This section is 
intended mainly to reinforce the secondary literature with the caveat that it will stress the historical 
nature of these phenomena. Popular discontent, state memorials, and muckraking journalism had by 
overwhelming fashion urged the necessity of what would become the Seventeenth Amendment by 
1906 at the latest – years before the passage of the measure. These dynamics were thus insufficient to 
account for the Senate’s support for a popular elections amendment. 
 As early as 1896, a formal report from a Senate committee noted that ‘the tendency of public 
opinion is to disparage and depreciate its [the Senate’s] usefulness, its integrity, and its power.’129 In 
1900, an article in the Los Angeles Times predicted that approximately ninety percent of the public 
would support direct elections of senators, if the question were submitted to a national referendum.130 
The sentiment had manifested itself in many ways. Farmer associations, ‘granges’, and other local 
organizations, especially in the West, sent petitions to Congress. It became a popular plank in the 
platforms of political parties, beginning with the People’s Party in 1892. The Democrats first 
endorsed the initiative long before the Seventeenth Amendment as well, in 1900, and did so in 1904, 
1908, and 1912. The Republican Party rejected a proposal for popular elections in 1908, but in his 
acceptance speech of the nomination, President Taft remarked: ‘With respect to the election of 
senators by the people, personally I am inclined to favor it, but it is hardly a party question.’131 
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  Based on my own research, newspaper articles from the 1890s demonstrate that popular 
opinion overwhelmingly supported the popular election of senators for decades. The Los Angeles 
Times declared in 1891, for instance, ‘There is growing sentiment in favor of electing U.S. senators 
by the people at large.’132 An article in the New York Times six months later used similar rhetoric: ‘A 
demand had been made… mostly in the West, for the election of U.S. senators by popular vote.’133 
Another article described the crystallizing demand: ‘The sentiment in favor of the change has been 
growing for a long time, and recent developments have strengthened it.’134 There is ‘widespread 
dissatisfaction with the present system’, noted the periodical, March.135 After the mid-1890s, with the 
movement gaining momentum, the language of newspapers changed. Now the demand was not only 
growing but nearly unanimous. Public opinion, declared the Los Angeles Times in 1896, is ‘loud and 
emphatic, pronounced as it is imperative’ and ‘almost unanimous among the great masses of 
people.’136 An article in 1899 noted: ‘Without much doubt, public sentiment throughout the country 
is favorable to changing the method of electing members to the American House of Lords.’137 
Another article observed: ‘Popular sentiment is undoubtedly growing up in favor of some change in 
the method of electing senators.’138 By 1902, ‘the prevailing sentiment of the American people was 
undoubtedly in favor of direct elections.’139  
 A similar dynamic occurred with the state legislatures, whereby increasing numbers came out 
in support of direct elections until a near-maximum threshold was attained years before 1911. In 
1891, for instance, both houses of the Wisconsin and Illinois Legislatures put themselves on record 
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as favoring the election of U.S. senators by popular vote.140 These formal petitions were followed by 
more than two dozen states. By 1900, Mr. Clark could tell his House colleagues that thirty-three 
states had declared for the election of senators by popular vote.141 Although some contend this 
number was not reached for several years afterwards, due to confusion stemming from a technicality 
of the petition process, it is clear that more than the two-thirds supported the initiative more than a 
half-dozen years before the Seventeenth Amendment. The turn of the century therefore witnessed the 
curious phenomena of a majority of legislatures repetitively electing U.S. senators who did not 
respect their views on direct elections. Idaho exemplifies this trend. Its legislature instructed its two 
senators to support the measure. One of its senators, Mr. Borah, vigorously complied; its other 
senator, Mr. Heyburn, was one of the measure’s fiercest opponents. He openly maneuvered to block 
the amendment. When asked why he would not comply with the instructions of the state legislature, 
he replied: ‘A man who is afraid of his legislature or whose vote is affected by what his legislature 
may do is not fit to be here.’142  
 The third component motivating popular elections which the secondary literature emphasizes 
is muckraking journalism. Certainly, it is true that the campaign for direct elections ‘took a large step 
forward’ after February 1899 when the publisher William Randolph Hearst decided to make direct 
elections of senators an objective of his publishing empire. Early in 1905, Heart purchased 
Cosmopolitan, a respectable family magazine, which quickly became one of the nations most 
sensationalized muckraking journals.143 Heart hired the rising star, David Graham Philips, to write a 
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series of articles appearing from March through November 1906. Philips directed his fire at twenty-
one senators, all of whom were very wealthy.144  
‘Treason is a strong word, but not too strong, rather too weak, to characterize the 
situation in which the Senate is the eager, resourceful, indefatigable agent of interests as 
hostile to the American people as an invading army could be, and vastly more 
dangerous; interests that manipulate the prosperity produced by all, so that it heaps up 
riches for the few; interests whose growth and power can only mean the degradation of 
the people, of the educated into sycophants and the masses towards serfdom.’145  
 
By May, Cosmopolitan’s circulation had doubled. In truth, many of his writings were exaggerated, if 
not patently false, such as his accusations that Senator John Aldrich’s daughter married Commodore 
Vanderbilt’s only son as proof that the two men were involved in a perfidious act to defraud the 
American people.146 These flagrant portrayals stimulated existing popular sentiment for direct 
elections – at least initially.  
 Ultimately, Phillips went too far and earned the wrath of politicians; President Theodore 
Roosevelt himself coined the derisive expression ‘muckraker’ to describe Phillips’ overstated 
journalism.147 The nation’s respectable press reacted unfavorably to Phillips as well. Editors feared 
that the series would discredit their own efforts to bring reform. In fact, to many observers, after 
initially garnering support for direct election, Phillips’ unsubstantiated accusations paralyzed the 
cause for an amendment.148 The editor of Collier’s wrote in 1906: ‘These articles made reform 
odious.’ Another editor noted that muckrakers were ‘undermining the confidence and destroying the 
respect’ of investigative journalism which had been built up by truthful and conscientious work.149 
Supreme Court Justice George Shiras, Jr. criticized muckrakers when he declared: ‘I doubt whether 
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the young men, who are writing for the magazines for the profit of those publications, rather than the 
prosperity of the country, can improve upon the work of the founders of the government.’150 
 As late as 1905, the Los Angeles Times observed: ‘It cannot be said, with truth, that any 
material progress toward a realization of the proposed amendment has been made.’151 That 
assessment stemmed from the realities that public opinion was not progressive but fluctuated over 
time; the total number of states supporting direct elections – 33 – reached its high-water mark 
thirteen years before the Seventeenth Amendment was ratified; and muckraking journalism was less 
important than typically portrayed. These factors encouraged electoral reform, but did not guarantee 
a Constitutional amendment. 
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Section IV.     Inside the Senate 
 
(A).  Political Arguments Against Direct Elections 
(B).  Institutional Factors Making Reform Unlikely 
 
 
 The previous section emphasized out-of-doors pressure for electoral reform. This section 
takes an inside look at the Senate from 1890 to 1911, with special emphasis on the few years before 
the amendment passed. No other systematic portrayal of the Senate’s reaction to the agitation exists 
among published material to my knowledge. This section is important because it shows that many 
governmental officials believed steadfastly in indirect elections as planned by the Founding Fathers, 
and that despite widespread public support for change, the stimulus was not powerful enough to pass 
the Senate until the four factors coalesced. 
 
Section IV (A).  Political Arguments Against Direct Elections 
 
 Mr. George Hoar of Massachusetts vocalized many of the strongest arguments against direct 
elections. He and his colleagues fired back at advocates who asserted that indirect elections had 
corrupted the Senate. Mr. Hoar thought that popular elections of senators actually created even 
greater temptations for bribery.152 Indirect elections saved the Senate from dealing with the 
demagoguery, falsified returns, and fraudulent residence disputes that characterized the campaigns in 
the House. Part of Mr. Hoar’s antagonism was also based on Constitutional grounds; he went so far 
as to argue that without the senatorial principle of indirect representation, ‘it was matter of historical 
fact… that the Constitution never would have been agreed to.’153  
 Opponents also counted among their members the venerable figures of Mr. Elihu Root of 
New York and Mr. George Edmunds of Vermont. During the debates, Mr. Root, a former Secretary 
of State and future Nobel Prize winner, recognized the potential folly of electoral reform. American 
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democracy has been so successful, he argued, because the country has made it practically impossible 
for the frenzy of the moment to carry out excesses which have wrecked other experiments in history. 
‘No one can see foresee the far-reaching effects,’ Mr. Root said, ‘of changing the language of the 
Constitution in any manner which affects the relations of the states to the general government.’154 
Mr. Root believed so fervently in the principle of indirect elections he refused to stand for popular 
elections after the passage of the amendment.155 ‘How little we know what any amendment would 
produce’, he exclaimed.156 
 Many U.S. senators questioned whether the problem was serious enough to warrant a 
Constitutional amendment. It is true that the Senate’s reputation had suffered from the antebellum 
period, but it was still widely respected. Of all the Upper Chambers in the world, the U.S. Senate was 
still regarded as the most successful.157 ‘Who could declare,’ asked a senator in 1892, ‘looking at the 
distinguished men who had occupied seats in the Senate for the last one hundred years, if senators 
had been chosen by popular vote, there would have been better men, greater, or nobler men?’158 In 
1896, the New York Times noted: ‘The Senate of the United Stated should be, and in fact is, the most 
dignified as well as the most important legislative body in the world.’159 An editorial in the New York 
Times noted that ‘in the company of senators a member of the President’s cabinet looks like a 
farmer.’160 Three years later, Woodrow Wilson wrote, ‘Most of the leading figures among the active 
public men of the country are now to be found in the Senate, not in the House.’161 A newly published 
book in 1910 observed, ‘without exception, the strongest and most effective’ legislative assembly in 
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the world’ is the American Senate.162 And even if the Senate had degenerated of late, Mr. Hoar 
contended, many senators were ‘often worse than any senators now.’163  
 One of the trump cards of direct elections opponents was to point out that the real problem 
with indirect election did not stem from U.S. senators but with malfeasance in state legislatures. ‘You 
cannot purify the fountain by changing the form of the stream that comes from it’,164 one senator 
famously remarked in reference to the pervasive corruption of government. Based on my research, 
nearly every state legislature from 1890 to 1913 faced alarming scandals themselves, from the typical 
money laundering to an atypical instance of state officials allegedly being ‘persuaded’ to vote a 
certain way by women agents hired by a corporate entity .165 Mr. Root made this point explicitly: ‘If 
people would look properly to the selection of legislative candidates’, he was sure there would be 
‘comparatively little complaint regarding senators.’166 James Gibbons, the second man in America to 
be made a Cardinal (in 1886), pointed out the obvious in a slight against the public: ‘If you cannot 
trust the members of the legislature how can you trust their constituents from whom they spring?’167 
 Senators defended indirect elections in other ways as well. ‘Have there been no millionaires 
elected as governors of states?’ asked one senator rhetorically, anticipating the costs that would 
underlay campaigning in popular elections.168 ‘This will cease to be a deliberative body’, another 
senator remonstrated, ‘if every senator has to convince, to explain to the great body of the people of 
his state every act he performs and every concession he makes.’169 Others asserted that the Senate’s 
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abuses had not been nearly as serious a menace to the public interest as the reckless haste and 
partisan manipulation which characterized much of the proceedings of the House. In that institution, 
there had been some 350 contested elections stemming from controversies of the popular vote.170 It 
was widely asserted that popular elections would deprive the states of men of wisdom who would not 
undertake the labor and inconvenience of a popular campaign.171 
More worrisome was the potential for an amendment to establish disconcerting precedents. 
When Mr. Palmer of Illinois took the initiative in support of direct elections in 1892, Mr. Chandler 
objected on the grounds that it would result in other ghostly changes. ‘If adopted, it would be 
followed by provisions for the choice of President and Vice-President by the people,’ altering the 
fundamental framework of the U.S. government, he told his colleagues.172 Rather than go so far as an 
amendment, therefore, some senators sought reform measures to enhance, rather than abolish, 
indirect procedures.173 ‘Practically the same result of an amendment for direct elections can be 
achieved indirectly, as has been attained in several states’, noted the Los Angeles Times in 1906.174 A 
thoughtful response came from Mr. Root, who questioned why ‘abandon… rather than reform the 
system.’175 This had the advantages of precedent and feasibility: in 1866 Congress passed a law 
requiring state legislatures to choose U.S. senators by majority vote, rather than a vote based on 
plurality.176 The law unfortunately created more frequent legislative deadlocks; why not revise the 
law, asked Mr. Root, to permit election by plurality in order to end deadlocks?177 Of the 1,180 
senators elected from 1789 to 1909, only fifteen were contested due to allegations of corruption. 
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Only seven of these, or .006 percent, had been denied their seats. ‘That is a pretty good record’, 
observed Mr. Heyburn in a rare moment of brevity.178 
 
Section IV (B).  Institutional Factors Making Reform Unlikely 
  
 In addition to strong political arguments against direct elections, other factors – namely 
institutional ones – created conditions that decelerated the Seventeenth Amendment’s progress. 
Factors such as the use of the filibusters and certain procedural rules made the Senate amenable to 
the minority control of senators (in opposition to the amendment). Senators’ use of ‘strategic voting’ 
created even greater imposing barriers to the amendment. These so-called killer amendments 
stultified the aims of senators genuinely interested in the amendment. 
 One of the major institutional factors impeding the measure involved sophisticated voting, 
wherein senators stapled minor ‘amendments’ to resolutions ostensibly calling for popular election of 
senators. The strategy was to intentionally defeat the popular cause in a backhanded manner. No 
fewer than seven senators by my count – Mr. Depew, Mr. Penrose, Mr. Borah, Mr. Root, Mr. Bacon, 
Mr. Sutherland, and Mr. Bristow – proposed additions to the actual amendment, slightly altering its 
wording or the mechanisms for its enforcement. Each time this backlogged the process. Each time 
new versions added conflicts of interest, making it unlikely the resolution would pass.  
 The first example occurred in 1902 with Mr. Penrose, whose addition to the affirmative 
House resolution scuttled any chances a Constitutional amendment may have had of passing the 
Senate at that time. In addition to giving the people the right to select U.S. senators, Mr. Penrose 
proposed that each state should be given one additional senator for every additional ratio of 500,000 
people.179 This was a perfect example of what political scientists today call ‘sophisticated voting’. As 
Duke Professor John Aldrich explains in Why Parties?, the Senate has invariably featured incentives 
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for actors to misreveal preferences; that is, to act ‘strategically’ rather than to express preferences 
‘sincerely.’180 Mr. Penrose’s objective was not actually to have a Constitutional amendment passed 
but to gain notoriety to show what would be the frightening outcome of the adoption of the plan.181 
As Mr. Stewart of Nevada had argued a few days earlier, direct elections would eventually result ‘in 
another step being taken which would result in depriving smaller states of representation.’182 Mr. 
Penrose thus killed the amendment.  
 A couple of weeks later, Mr. Depew further hurt the chances for electoral reform by cloaking 
his objectives in another ‘killer amendment’. His direct elections resolution required that 
qualifications to vote for senators and representatives shall be uniform in all states, a demand that had 
little chance of gaining the support of states’ rights advocates.183 The New York Times remarked: 
‘Advocates of direct elections heard this morning with dismay’ the proposal of Mr. Depew.184 The 
qualification practically killed the Senate resolution, noted another article: ‘Those who favor the 
resolution in the committee do not favor the Depew amendment.’185 Depew ‘scuttled the resolution’, 
explained another writer, ‘after the amendment, the committee was hamstrung.’186 
In 1908, Mr. Depew offered another amendment providing for the direct election of senators 
according to population.187 The new resolution frightened senators that their institution would be 
transformed into a quasi-Lower House; the proposal was too grandiose to garner support. Mr. 
Penrose then amplified Mr. Depew’s resolution by introducing yet another amendment. He proposed 
a popular elections resolution with the caveat that senators be apportioned by population. According 
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to its terms, this time around, no state could command more than fifteen senators.188 These 
qualifications ensured the defeat of direct elections proposal yet again.  
  A fifth example of strategic voting damaging the stimulus came in 1911 with Mr. Root’s 
proposal. Assailing direct elections for an hour and a half in the Senate, Root introduced a bill in 
February amending the 1866 statute on the subject and providing if a legislature fails to cast a 
majority for a candidate before the first of March preceding the date of the beginning of the new 
term, a plurality vote shall suffice. The New York Times bemoaned that the proposal ‘complicated’ 
the pending Seventeenth Amendment.189 The Root bill was severely criticized by many senators and 
was not passed. ‘Its obvious purpose to offset agitation in favor of popular elections was manifest 
from the start,’ noted the New York Times.190 Moreover, an additional hurdle the Seventeenth 
Amendment had to pass was the compromise plan on the Borah amendment. Instead of making direct 
elections mandatory upon the states, the resolution decreed that the various state legislatures would 
simply be authorized to pass a popular election statue if they should see fit. In this way, opponents of 
popular elections believed they would effectively ‘take much wind from the sails’ of supporters for 
the Borah resolution.191 Mr. Borah himself was not happy with the course his amendment had taken, 
and the proposal lived a short life. 
 Other institutional factors affected the prospects for electoral reform in the Senate. In 1899, 
for instance, Mr. Heyburn of Idaho tried to manipulate procedural rules to his advantage to the 
detriment of popular elections. After the Committee of Judiciary reported favorably to an 
amendment, Mr. Heyburn challenged the right of existence of the committee itself. He raised the 
point that the resolution adopted a week earlier reorganizing the Committee of the Judiciary went 
into effect only at noon a week later, and thus the meeting of the committee earlier that day (and by 
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implication its favorable report) were out of order.192 The point was technically correct. But, 
proponents argued back, because the report was made after twelve, the rules of the Senate forbid 
inquiry into the action of standing committees. Ultimately, the report advanced unimpaired, but the 
measure was decisively defeated before the full chamber.193 Apparently, Mr. Heyburn did not forget 
the tactic because eleven years later he would make the same attempt again, resulting in precisely the 
same fashion.194   
 Mr. Heyburn and his flare for attempting to outmaneuver opponents on issues of procedure 
appeared on the scene with another scheme in 1911. Bitterly opposed to direct election of senators, 
he was even more hostile to another measure the Senate was discussing, Canadian reciprocity. He 
openly pledged to filibuster for as long as his health permitted, since ‘filibustering against one of 
these measures is filibustering against the other.’195 And the attempt paid off: days of Senate sessions 
appear to have been wasted because of Mr. Heyburn’s rants. Cloture, the motion to bring debate 
quickly to an end, did not exist in 1911. (It was instituted in the Senate six years later in 1917 in an 
attempt to prevent a few willful men from thwarting the Treaty of Versailles.)196 Thus, even if a 
supermajority wanted to end Mr. Heyburn’s scheming, they had no device to do so. According to the 
New York Times, filibusters prevented or delayed action on a host of imminent votes in the Spring of 
1911, including popular election of senators, tariff measures, Canadian reciprocity, and a vote as to 
the fate of Mr. Lorimer of Illinois.197 The Senate had long been accustomed to such filibusters. In 
1893, a minority against tariff reform notoriously claimed, it seemed, ‘unlimited time for debate and 
talk and talk, and talk and talk’; Mr. Allen spoke one night for twelve hours, not to enlighten his 
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colleagues but simply to prevent the taking of a vote.198 So endless was the discourse in 1911, 
however, that an extra session for the Senate was ordered, while senators began earnestly calling to 
limit filibusters.199 Ultimately, to the surprise of contemporaries, the Seventeenth Amendment passed 
in the next term, partly because Mr. Heyburn was not in good physical condition and realized that 
single-handedly he could not forever prevent a vote on popular elections.200 He passed away less than 
a year later, of heart and kidney complications, at sixty years of age.  
 A final way institutional factors in the Senate delayed the Seventeenth Amendment involved 
an unprecedented question of procedure, the settlement of which has developed into established 
precedent.201 The matter concerned the Constitutionality of the actions of the Vice-President, James 
Sherman (who tragically passed away eight months later). The Constitution, of course, gave the Vice 
President the authority to cast a deciding ballot in the case of a legislative tie in the Senate. When the 
Senate tied 44-44 on the so-called Bristow clause of Seventeenth Amendment in June of 1911, the 
VP cast an affirmative vote – breaking the tie.202 What was the problem? President William Taft’s 
junior partner created an unprecedented Constitutional debate because never before had a VP broken 
a tie on an amendment. Mr. Reed of Missouri insisted the VP had overextended his hand; his power 
was limited to break ties on ordinary legislation, he insisted, not amendments.203 An investigation 
was launched. And the Seventeenth Amendment was forced to jump over another institutional 
hurdle. The objection was ultimately overcome, claimed the Los Angeles Times, by a subsequent vote 
of 64 to 24 adopting the Seventeenth Amendment with the Bristow clause.204 In hindsight, it seems 
that the Seventeenth Amendment in similar form would have soon passed anyway even had Mr. 
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Sherman capitulated and not cast the deciding ballot.205 Based on my research, the Seventeenth 
Amendment was fait accompli by this time. The following pages explain what brought on this 
suddenly sanguine trajectory. 
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Section V.       Critical Factors 
 
(A).  Mr. Lorimer’s Scandal and Other Corruption, 1910-11 
(B).  Ineffective State Primary Laws, 1908-1911 
(C).  The Explosive Issue of Race, 1911 
(D).  Death of Mr. Allison and ‘The Four’, 1908-11 
 
 
 
 The previous sections have established that the stimulus for direct elections had been 
simmering for decades but were not strong enough to convince the Senate to support the Seventeenth 
Amendment. It took four critical factors from 1908-11 to coalesce in rapid succession to change the 
issue of direct elections into a question necessitating national change. This explanatory framework is 
based overwhelmingly on primary sources never before published. 
 
Section V (A).  Mr. Lorimer’s Scandal and Other Corruption, 1910-11 
  
 In 1909, a local story catapulted to the nation’s front-pages implicating Mr. William Lorimer 
of Illinois as the lead agent in a large swindle case. Over the next two years, a scandal ensued that 
became the most sensationalized investigation in the history of the Senate up to that time.206 Some 
749 pages of testimony were taken during the investigation.207 The case stirred public opinion in 
favor of electoral reform to an unprecedented extent before the convicted senator was expelled in 
1912, halfway through his term. 
 Mr. Lorimer was not a newcomer to making a splash in the headlines. Before being indicted 
in the swindle case, the senator’s ascent to the U.S. Senate in 1909 had been greeted with excitement 
for ending a deadlock lasting four-and-a-half months in the Illinois Legislature. A bipartisan coalition 
had ended the stalemate by electing Lorimer, a dark horse candidate acceptable to both parties.208 
This deadlock by itself whipped up public opinion to a frenzy, but it was a breeze compared to the 
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whirlwind to follow. Two years later, in April, the Chicago Tribune broke the story that Lorimer’s 
election had been accomplished by bribery, ‘throwing Illinois politicians into tumult.’209 The 
disclosure came from a statement by Representative Charles White that he had received $1,000 from 
Lee O. Brown, the Democratic leader of the Lower House, to vote for Lorimer and another $900 
from Robert Wilson, another Democratic legislator – as his share of the ‘jackpot’, a general 
corruption fund being distributed among the entire legislature.210 Adjusted to 2009 dollars, this 
appears to have equaled the sum of approximately $45,000.211 A day later, two other members of the 
legislature came forward with testimony supporting the charges. One of these state senators 
remarked: ‘A Democratic senator, an honest man, in whose word I have every confidence, told me 
just before Mr. Lorimer was elected senator that he had been offered $1,000 if he would vote for 
Lorimer and use his influence with another legislator to do the same. He refused.’212 
 The months ahead followed with a similar outpouring of evidence and new indictments. The 
leader of the Illinois House was indicted on the charge of bribery at the same time as Representatives 
Robert Wilson and Michael Link.213 A fourth legislator at the end of May confessed to taking a bribe 
to vote for him.214 The scandal reached the highest levels of government: the Governor of the state, 
Mr. Deneen, as well as fifty-five other witnesses were indicted to bring forth testimony.215 The U.S. 
Senate itself began investigating Lorimer’s election in the Spring of that year, with one U.S. senator 
insisting ‘Mr. Lorimer must have known what was going on… he was a seasoned politician.’216  
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 Other senatorial scandals began to rage at the same time. In July of 1910, for instance, Mr. 
Fowler, while campaigning for the U.S. Senate seat of New Jersey, called the state a ‘rotten borough 
and a cesspool of corruption.’217 A New York scandal dominated the headlines when it was revealed 
that the Upper House unanimously voted to investigate allegations of corruption against state senator 
Jonathan Allds.218 The Los Angeles Times called the accusations against Allds, ‘a most startling story 
of legislative corruption’, in reference to the accused’s alleged demands for sums of money in return 
for legislative favors.219 Also in the summer of 1910, notably before the crucial elections in 
November of that year, a U.S. senator from Oklahoma let it be known that he had been approached 
for disreputable purposes. Mr. Thomas Gore claimed on the floor of the Senate in late June that a 
bribe of some $50,000 had been offered to him – more than one million dollars in 2009 terms. 220 He 
claimed to have rejected the bribe, which had been offered to block legislation adverse to plans 
disposing of land inhabited by Choctaw and Chickasaw Native Americans. Despite Mr. Gore’s 
appropriate actions, his story angered the public and hinted at the pervasiveness of corruption in the 
Senate. It was then reported that the ringleader of the bribery plan was being offered the vast sum of 
at least three million dollars should he succeed, $68,000,000 in 2009 dollars.221  
 These new allegations exceeded the threshold of what was considered acceptable. The 
Lorimer scandal, in particular, roused the malcontent of the public because of its long duration. It is 
worth contrasting that experience with a modern-day scandal involving the Illinois Legislature and 
governor, that of Mr. Rod Blagojevich. Blagojevich’s domination of headlines lasted some three 
months, from December 2008 to February 2009, which covered the looming indictment by federal 
prosecutors in early December, his imminent impeachment in January, and his unusual appearances 
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on the Late Show with David Letterman and the View in early February.222 It only took three months 
for Mr. Blagojevich to become ‘the most hated man in America’, in the words of The New 
Republic.223 By contrast, the Lorimer scandal kept the public in a fit for two years. Mr. William J. 
Bryan declared that the Democratic legislators who elected Lorimer should be read out of the 
party.224 And, in September of that year, former President Roosevelt denounced Lorimer in what was 
called by the New York Times, ‘one of the stiffest talks on corruption in public life ever delivered to 
an American audience by a public man.’225 Speaking at the prestigious Hamilton Club in Chicago, 
Mr. Roosevelt reportedly ‘took their breath away by the directness and vigor’ of his denunciation.226 
He accused the Illinois Legislature of the ‘foulest corruption and most infamous treason to American 
institution.’ He defied any person ‘of average intelligence who would read the confessions and 
statements, taken by two State’s Attorneys, not to come to the same conclusion.’ The speech was met 
with thunderous applause. It was reported to be one of the most forceful speeches Colonel Roosevelt 
ever delivered.227 
 The Lorimer scandal aroused unmatched anger as well because of the senator’s emphatic 
claims of innocence despite mounting evidence to the contrary. Speaking before the U.S. Senate, 
Lorimer dispassionately ‘expressed to his associates… he had done no wrong to secure the election, 
and believed that no friend had done wrong for him.’228 These denials came even as the Senate 
prepared and passed a resolution declaring the election fraudulent and therefore void. This scandal, 
as well as the other allegations coming at the same time, invigorated the demand for reform to an 
unprecedented extent, and was therefore a critical factor prompting the Seventeenth Amendment. 
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Section V (B). Ineffective State Primaries, 1909-1911  
  
 An informal collaboration of governors and other prominent officials, led by Woodrow 
Wilson of New Jersey, instilled the movement for direct elections with an aura of strength and 
professionalism it had heretofore lacked. They rallied to bring a national solution to the problem of 
indirect elections the states had made worse by devising abortive reforms. As the states had 
recognized for decades, the difficulty of securing a Constitutional amendment meant that the ills of 
indirect elections were theoretically easier to solve on a state-wide basis that at the highest levels of 
government. Unfortunately, by 1908, it became strikingly clear that state attempts at solutions – 
primary laws in essence giving the public the right to vote for U.S. senators – were inherently flawed. 
They could not by themselves end the party bossism that dominated state politics or effectively deal 
with charges that state laws were unconstitutional, as Washington’s Supreme Court declared in 1910. 
The Seventeenth Amendment was seen as a politically savvy and wise way to end these complaints. 
 Woodrow Wilson first caught the attention of the country at large by intervening in a 
senatorial election in 1909.229 As governor-elect, he boldly declared that in the coming session of the 
legislature ‘self-respecting Democrats’ could vote only for Mr. James Martine, the Democrat who 
had won a primary for U.S. senator, but was not backed by the party machine. This was not a partisan 
issue, Mr. Wilson declared, but a moral issue: he supported Martine not because he believed he was 
the most deserving, but because he was indicated as the preference of a large plurality of Democrats 
who voted in the primary.230 The mainstream media latched on to the story after Mr. Wilson made a 
backhanded threat against the New Jersey Legislature: ‘I have no fear the Legislature will go back on 
our platform pledges’, he declared. ‘If anything of the kind is attempted… I can make more trouble 
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for them than they can make for me.’231 Wilson thus went out of his way to convince Democratic 
legislators it was their duty to vote for Mr. Martine.232  
 The campaign for direct elections was actually rejuvenated before Woodrow Wilson was 
governor-elect, in 1906, when Mr. Chamberlain, the Governor of Oregon, received an official notice 
from the Ohio Legislature inviting him to join in a cross-country movement for electoral reform. Mr. 
Chamberlain replied that he was heartily in favor of the effort and would cooperate.233 That same 
year, Mr. Cummins, the Governor of Iowa, called for a national convention to abolish indirect 
elections. Other governors notified Mr. Cummins that they were excited to join his effort.234 Less 
than twelve months later, Mr. Edward Stokes, Governor of New Jersey, committed himself to a plan 
that was tantamount to the election of senators by direct vote.235 In 1911, Governor Judson Harmon 
of Ohio was credited for persuading state officials that the shrewdest course for the state was direct 
elections, when a state primary resolution passed the Legislature in February.236 Governor Glasscock 
of Virginia responded by recommending to the state legislature that they endorse popular election of 
senators.237 When the Seventeenth Amendment ultimately passed, it was the Governor of 
Massachusetts, Mr. Foss, who first publicly urged the state legislature to ratify the amendment.238  
 The initiative also received a major boost from Mr. Bryan, who was widely regarded as the 
most powerful Democrat in the country.239 ‘With the zeal of a new convert’, described the Los 
Angeles Times, Mr. Bryan advocated direct elections: ‘I think it is time to speak plainly in regard to 
the U.S. Senate’, he said, in preface to his endorsement for an amendment.240 Later that year, 10,000 
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people gathered in sweltering heat at Madison Square Garden in New York to hear a speech from 
Mr. Bryan, the Democratic nominee for President; a thunder of approval greeted Bryan when he 
spoke in favor of direct elections.241 The event bubbled with excitement partly due to Bryan’s well 
known declaration a few weeks earlier exhorting President Taft to come out in unwavering support of 
direct elections.242 Mr. Bryan urged Mr. Taft to follow up with real action after his implicit 
endorsement of direct elections made at the 1907 Republican Convention. It was believed that if the 
President took a firm position, it would go a long way towards accomplishing a Constitutional 
amendment.243 
 Several assessments can be gleaned from the information above to help understand the timing 
of the Seventeenth Amendment. First, it is noteworthy to consider when these prominent political 
figures came out in support of the measure. Notice that they did not publicly support reform in the 
1890s or the beginning half of the first decade of the twentieth century; they only clamored for direct 
elections after 1905. It was only after this time that Governor Chamberlain of Oregon, for instance, 
declared his intention to create a partnership with other governors to support an amendment, and it 
was only in 1910 that Woodrow Wilson famously declared that he ‘could make more trouble for the 
Legislature’ than vice versa. Not only should the dates of the statements be noticed, but so too should 
their substance. Importantly, Mr. Bryan always called for a Constitutional amendment; notably, New 
Jersey’s Legislature reported affirmatively to Governor Wilson’s request to urge their representative 
to support an amendment. Why did Bryan and Wilson want an amendment (instead of reform) and 
why did they call for it vigorously after 1906? First, it is instructive to recognize that the country as a 
whole was moving in a direction of greater domestic reform (discussed below), and therefore, it 
seems, there were political bounties to be reaped by capitalizing on public discontent. One article, for 
instance, sardonically portrayed Mr. Bryan as ‘engaging in political buncombe for the necessity of 
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change.’244 ‘Bryan seems to imagine that he has discovered a new issue in his advocacy of direct 
election of United States senators’, the article asserted, but this method ‘has been advocated for some 
years by men of all political parties, on the rostrum and in political platforms.’245 There were thus 
selfish reasons to support an amendment. 
 A second and less cynical motivation involves what I believe to have been a noble-minded 
decision on the part of Mr. Bryan and Governor Wilson: they believed a Constitutional amendment 
was in the best interest of the country because it would standardize state primaries. While this notion 
has not been raised in the scholarship, it is persuasive to me and most directly explains why an 
amendment came to be seen as necessary, instead of leaving the question of direct election to the 
states to decide. Primary laws had for years sought to achieve in essence what the Seventeenth 
Amendment accomplished, but these diverse state laws came to be seen as categorically flawed. The 
existing scholarship has not only missed this crucial link in trying to understand the timing of the 
amendment, but has also largely misinterpreted state primaries as a whole, by stressing its virtues as 
opposed to its shortcomings.246 My research shows that criticism against state primaries laws (not 
coincidentally) reached its high point in the immediate years before the Seventeenth Amendment. 
 In 1901, the Oregon Legislature enacted a law for the first time intended to secure the virtual 
election of senators to the U.S. Senate by popular vote.247 The law provided that ‘it shall be the duty 
of each house to count the votes and announce the candidate having the highest number and 
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thereupon the house shall proceed to the election of a senator.’248 This provision proved to be an 
abject failure the first time it was tried.249 The man who received a plurality of thirty-seven percent in 
the popular vote secured only a small minority of legislators’ vote, the members distributing their 
votes among fourteen candidates. A deadlock ensured, which lasted for five weeks, and ended in the 
election of a member who had not received a single vote in the much-vaunted popular election.250 
Even when the law was revised, and improved, the Oregon experiment continued to arouse great 
unease because in 1908 it looked as if a Republican Legislature would be forced to choose a 
Democrat for the U.S. Senate – a radical peculiarity at the turn of the century.251 Oregon had voted 
for Mr. Taft and was considered a Republican state, but in fact Mr. George Chamberlain, a 
Democrat, was sworn in as a member of the U.S. Senate. This was ‘an unprecedented violation of 
customs and principles of the party politic’, noted the Los Angeles Times in 1909.252 Contemporaries 
called the Oregon experiment ‘a poor innovation’ and noted how Oregon’s senators stood ‘far below 
the average’ of the Senate ‘in ability and further in morals.’253 
 By 1906, party primaries for senators had been designed in many other states, including 
Virginia, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Texas, and 
Kentucky.254 By 1912, twenty-eight of the forty-eight states had adopted some kind of senatorial 
primary, indicating that the prevailing sentiment of the legislatures and voting public was for 
foregoing indirect elections.255 Some scholars, notably William Riker, have misdiagnosed this fact to 
explain the Seventeenth Amendment as merely accomplishing formally what had been the case for 
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years. ‘There was little point in holding out’, Riker explains inadequately, in terms of why the Senate 
passed an amendment; it merely ‘formalized’ what the states had been doing for years256 This is an 
unsatisfactory account: it does not explain why governors and other leaders continuously supported a 
Constitutional amendment after 1906 if the states could effectively accomplish on their own what 
national legislation merely formalized. If every state could accomplish through state laws what the 
Seventeenth Amendment unnecessarily formalized, why would so many Southern senators – 
historically opponents of centralization – support direct elections? It is my belief that Riker could not 
be more incorrect when he says ‘there was little point in holding off’; this implies it was a passive 
change of little importance. In reality, the demand for direct elections continued to be boisterous up 
to the eve of its ratification, and it was an active, not a passive, demand; the Seventeenth Amendment 
was perceived as necessary to solve local problems springing from primary laws in a single swoop 
through a national remedy and to end party bossism that continued to plague Senate elections. 
 Starting in 1908, and rising in intensity thereafter, state primary laws for senators began to be 
seen as flawed. The problem was that the state primaries only increased the pervasive bossism that 
had plagued the indirect procedure. ‘As to corruption, it is more easily carried on under the new 
system than the old. This is the best tool in the hands of the political boss,’ noted the Los Angeles 
Times in 1909.257 ‘If the direct primary [in the hands of the parties] tended to establish popular 
control of public policy and promote good government, it ought not to be difficult to supply practical 
evidence. But we are constantly met not with evidence but apology’, noted the New York Times in 
1908 regarding state primaries.258 Perhaps the bitterest sentiments in this context were roused in 
Wisconsin in 1908, when Mr. Isaac Stephenson was elected under a state primary law amid 
allegations of corruption. Mr. Stephenson, the richest man in the state, was charged with bribing 
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officials $250,000 to vote for him.259 The successful assault against Mr. Stephenson led the New York 
Times to bemoan that ‘any boss in any state may defeat the popular will.’260 How long, Senator 
Husting asked rhetorically, ‘Can you use the cloak of the primary to debauch the electorate?’, 
referring to the ease with which party machines could control state primaries.261  
 Other states exhibited similar problems. The notorious Tom Taggart of Indiana, the long-time 
Democratic state boss, predictably came out in favor of primaries in 1910.262 Missouri’s election for 
a U.S. senator in 1908 was widely called ‘a conspiracy.’263 One of the clearest results of the Illinois 
primary for senator was reported to be ‘the success of politicians in manipulating’ the results.264 ‘We 
have warned, sincere, well meaning but misguided citizens not to trust it’, the Los Angeles Times 
concluded.265 Direct primary laws strengthened, not weakened, political manipulation and promoted 
the purchase of office.266  
 Charges that the state primary laws were, in fact, unconstitutional invigorated the perceived 
necessity for the Seventeenth Amendment. Most ominously, the Supreme Court of Washington 
declared in 1910 that the state’s provision providing for ‘popular elections’ violated the state 
constitution.267 These charges led to the uncomfortable situation where certain candidates pledged to 
abide by the Supreme Court’s decision and others to disregard it.268 Representative Gonna, for 
instance, made headlines when he announced his intention to ignore the ruling. Meanwhile, the North 
Dakota Supreme Court followed suit when it invalidated part of the state legislature’s primary law 
because it ‘adds another oath, declaration and test, as a qualification for office’ which was forbid 
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under the state constitution.269 Importantly, these controversies arose in notable pitch in the 
immediate years before the amendment passed. ‘The new system is unconstitutional and corrupt’, 
declared the Los Angeles Times in 1909 in reference to certain state primaries.270 The controversies 
engendered by these laws were thus a critical factor pushing the Seventeenth Amendment. 
 
Section V (C).  The Explosive Issue of Race, 1911 
 
 The Senate’s agenda regarding direct elections irrevocably changed in 1911 due to the 
racially-tinged issue of states’ rights. The role of race in the amendment’s timing has been 
significantly underplayed by the existing scholarship, but the truth is that the issue went a long way 
towards delaying the measure’s ratification – by at least two years based on my research. The 
problem was that many senators who genuinely supported a Constitutional amendment found 
themselves in the unusual and difficult spot of being forced to vote against the measure because of 
manipulated outcomes induced by strategic amendments and voting. A few conservative senators 
(fiercely opposed to direct elections) raised ‘killer amendments’ – defined as measures expected to 
cause a bill to fail.271 These intransigent senators introduced the issue of states’ rights and race to 
intentionally disrupt what was a popular cause and tantalize Southern senators historically sensitive 
to federal encroachment. To the South, the repetitively-introduced Sutherland/Bristow measure to the 
Seventeenth Amendment looked a lot like Reconstruction, if not another attempt at a Force Bill 
(1890). The race issue is so pivotal because it shows how the popular elections amendment depended 
on fleeting factors not only on the long-standing justifications stressed by scholars. Its successful 
reconciliation in the Senate in June 1911 goes a long way in explaining why it took the House twelve 
additional months to ratify the very stimulus it had sought for decades. 
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 In hindsight, the strategy of conservative opponents appears ingenious. By turning the issue 
of direct elections into a bitter controversy striking at the nerves of Southern senators, they made 
opponents out of members genuinely interested in progressive reform and significantly decreased the 
likelihood of the amendment’s passage. The key was to find a controversial issue tangentially related 
to popular elections, and then to insert that issue into the literal language of the amendment. 
Reactionary senators found their winning issue in the still festering wounds of the Civil War, an issue 
that the last decade had demonstrated still struck a sensitive chord in Southern states. The still strong 
passions engendered by disunion made the Democratic Party the ‘only choice for white voters in 
most sections of Dixie.’ In 1902, the New York Times noted about Delaware elections: ‘The price for 
Negroes in the counties is generally accepted to be $10 each.’272 In 1908, Maryland’s Senate nearly 
passed a Constitutional amendment to disenfranchise blacks.273 At the same time, Mr. Daniel of 
Virginia famously walked around the Senate chamber with crutches, as a result of three wounds he 
received as a Confederate soldier at the first Battle of Manassas.274 Two years later, during his 
emotional farewell address to the Senate, Mr. James Gordon of Mississippi acknowledged that he 
was ‘born a multi-millionaire’ but regretted spending ‘much of it on my slaves.’275276 Importantly, 
Southern senators resisted racial integration but at the same time supported progressive measures, 
such as direct elections of senators. In fact, in 1899, the New York Times discussed General Robert E. 
Lee in the context of electoral reform, noting that his still-living friends were in favor of nominating 
U.S. senators by popular vote.277   
 In January of 1911, the real fight over popular election of senators began in the Senate when 
Southern members opened an attack on the Sutherland resolution, which had been proposed by Mr. 
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Southerland of Utah in the preceding term.278 By May of 1911, the Los Angeles Times would say that 
the injection of the race question had lifted the ‘hitherto comparatively commonplace discussion of 
direct elections… to a plane of almost sensational interest.’279 Mr. Sutherland’s version of the 
Seventeenth Amendment explicitly reserved to Congress the authority to supervise Senate elections, 
if it should so desire.280 Southern senators worried that the clause would be used as a pretext to send 
federal agents to polling station to compel the counting of ‘Negro votes’.281 Even though most 
Southern senators supported direct elections, they felt compelled to vote against the entire measure 
because of the small part (the Bristow resolution) that tainted everything else.282 This led to an 
unfortunate snowballing effect, whereby actions to squash this small clause overshadowed the true 
point of the stimulus – direct elections. On January 22, a group of Southern senators proposed its 
own clause, which explicitly gave the states full power over the popular elections.283 The Southern 
position, in turn, disturbed Northern Democrats who favored direct elections but did not wish to 
alienate Southern colleagues.284 They worried that this guarantee would give Southern states carte 
blanche to disenfranchise blacks. Some senators urged emphatically that the Southern senators’ 
proposal was, in fact, unconstitutional: it practically repealed Sec. IV, Part I of Art. I of the 
Constitution, which gave Congress the power to regulate the times, places, and manner of calling 
elections for representation.285 It also appeared to contradict the Fifteenth Amendment.286 The 
Southern proposal died not long thereafter but the controversy continued. 
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 Indeed, it was just heating up. The problem stemmed from staunch direct election opponents, 
who engineered additional ‘killer amendments’. These stand-pat Republicans, many of whom were 
Northerners, intentionally misrevealed preferences. They supported the Sutherland amendment in 
order to ensure Southern distaste for the basic measure and later joined Southerners in voting against 
direct elections.287 Federal authority over senate elections was necessary, Northern Republicans 
began to insist, to prevent potential ambiguity on the subject. On February 10, 1911, Mr. Root roused 
the Senate when he said that ‘things happen’ in Southern states which ought to be corrected by the 
federal government. Without the Southerland clause, ‘Southern Negroes’ could not be assured of 
their franchise, pleaded Mr. Root in a veiled attempt at sincerity.288 This is when the race problem 
really began to ‘jolt the Senate’, as a front-page story on the Los Angeles Times read.289 A Southern 
senator, Mr. Bacon, asked for clarification: ‘What are the things to which the senator refers?’ Root 
responded by explicitly referring to the peonage system, the lynching of blacks, and disfranchisement 
provisions, such as the grandfather clauses of many Southern states, as things calculated to deprive 
black men of equal protection. References to lynchings ‘are red rags to the Southern delegations’ and 
Mr. Bacon was on his feet at once: ‘I might say the lynchings are not confined to Southern states. 
The great state of New York is not exempt to them.’290 The session concluded with everyone 
knowing why lynchings and peonage had been brought into the controversy.291  
 In mid-February, Mr. Borah of Idaho, a direct elections supporter, pointed out the obvious: 
supporters of the Sutherland proposal lacked sincerity and wished to kill the direct elections proposal 
by drawing the race question into it.292 ‘The Negro has been used as a political football about as long 
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as own sense of decency and his developing intelligence will permit!’, he declared.293 Mr. Borah 
agreed that Northern states had not dealt more leniently with blacks than any other section of the 
country: ‘In the North, we burn the Negro at the stake, and there, as in other sections, we have our 
race wars. We push our Negroes to the outer edge of the industrial world; we exhibit the same 
prejudice, the same weakness, the same intolerance that is apparent in the South.’ In this way, Mr. 
Borah upbraided his party for playing the ‘hypocrite’ and ‘moral coward’ on the Seventeenth 
Amendment.294 By February 18, the Senate appeared to be enmeshed in an apparently hopeless 
tangle on the question.295 Race had transformed the debate on direct elections for senators.   
 Thereafter the question of direct elections became associated with the very ideals of the 
country and harkened back to the debates on the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. The 
Sutherland amendment became perceived by many senators as necessary ‘to preserve the continuity 
of Congress itself’, in the words of Mr. Carter.296 Mr. Nelson then came out and declared his 
steadfast support for the Sutherland clause to the extent that the army should be called in to enforce 
its provisions.297 Mr. Bacon responded that this would establish a ghastly precedent. It might be used 
in other sections of the country, he reminded his western colleagues. For instance, the ‘yellow peril’ 
might assert itself in California.298 Mr. Percy of Mississippi denounced the clause, arguing it would 
ultimately allow the federal government to invade the states and control all elections on the state, 
county, and municipal level. It is ‘monstrous and preposterous’, he declared.299 
 Had it not been for the Sutherland clause, it appears almost certain that the Seventeenth 
Amendment would have passed the Senate in February at the latest (and the House a year sooner). 
When a vote was held on February 28, the two-thirds majority needed fell short by a vote of 54 pros, 
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33 cons. In the words of the New York Times, ‘Charges were repeatedly made that the Sutherland 
amendment… was offered only for the purpose of killing the resolution.’300 This was strategic 
scheming at its foremost; opponents of direct elections knew Southern senators could not support the 
Seventeenth Amendment at that time with this strident clause. Mr. Rayner explained that the race 
issue ‘affected a large number of members on the Democratic side of the chamber.’301 Mr. Percy of 
Mississippi flatly explained the problem: although the people of his state ‘favored popular elections, 
they did not think it is worth the price of lost state control over elections.’302  
 When the Senate reconvened in May, Joseph Bristow of Kansas proposed what would 
ultimately become the Seventeenth Amendment. It was nearly identical to the Sutherland version 
proposed months earlier.303 The Bristow resolution was added to the Seventeenth Amendment by a 
vote of 45-44, with Vice President Sherman casting the controversial deciding vote. The adoption of 
the Bristow resolution was made possible by Mr. Clark of Arkansas, who cast the only Democratic 
vote for it.304 Mr. Bacon then moved to add a resolution to the Bristow amendment, qualifying that 
the Seventeenth Amendment to prohibit federal supervision of senatore elections, unless the state 
legislature refused or failed to act; it was defeated 46 to 43.305 Again, the Senate discussion focused 
on the issue of federal control of Senate elections, rather than on direct elections itself.306 
 With the Bristow resolution affirmed by a 45-44 vote, with ten new progressive senators 
sitting in the chamber, and the race controversy quelled by the flow of time, the Senate on June 12, 
1911 adopted the Seventeenth Amendment by vote of 64 to 24. Six more than the necessary two-
thirds majority voted for the amendment. Of the twenty-four negative votes, eight were cast by 
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Democrats and sixteen by Republicans.307 Specifically, those in opposition were eight Southern 
senators as well as every Republican senator from the New England states, New York, and 
Pennsylvania.308 Strategic voting was apparent in this final vote. A number of senators complained 
that Mr. Bristow was inconsistent; in the previous session he had voted against the Sutherland 
amendment; he then proposed, campaigned, and voted for a nearly identical draft.309  
 These voting maneuverings indicate that the Seventeenth Amendment was passed for selfish 
reasons as well as high-minded ones. As Mr. Bacon noted, the question of race was in no way 
cognate to direct elections.310 Officials shielded their genuine preferences and engaged in political 
legerdemain to increase their visibility on record and to get their way on an issue that a majority 
genuinely desired. It is also important in demonstrating why the amendment passed the Senate before 
the House. Even though the House had for decades vigorously supported the direct election of U.S. 
senators, it took over a year for the House to ratify the Seventeenth Amendment. The Bristow 
provision was even more controversial in the House than the Senate because of the Lower Chamber’s 
‘unbroken alignment of Democrats’ who were ‘against federal interference in elections in states.’311 
The House refused to ratify the amendment to the point where observers expected that ‘the Senate 
may have to reconsider’ the amendment.312 Ten days after it had passed the Senate, the House 
decisively defeated the Bristow resolution, 112-172. It would have taken seventy-eight more votes to 
carry. The tight partisan division in the House delaying the amendment did not exist in the Senate at 
the same time. The Senate was less amenable to partisan control because of several demoralizing 
events involving the Republican leadership in 1908. That storyline is explored below. 
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Section V (D).  Death of Mr. Allison and ‘The Four’, 1908-11 
 
 This debate on race prompting the Seventeenth Amendment may have been a moot point had 
it not been for a sanguine set of circumstances that were understandably greeted with grief. This 
fourth and critical factor did not convince officials of the necessity of the Seventeenth Amendment as 
the previous factors, but its occurrence from 1908-11 can easily be seen as having a decisive impact 
on timing. Before his untimely death, the Republican leader in the Senate, Mr. Allison, led a highly 
influential group of senators, known as ‘The Four’. By 1911, ‘The Four’ had disappeared – not due 
to losing any election but because of poor health, old age, and retirement. This factor is intuitively 
very significant, but to my knowledge has not been discussed as an element sparking the Seventeenth 
Amendment. 
The unexpected death of William Allison of Iowa, who won a record seventh term two 
months before his death, went a long way towards allowing the Seventeenth Amendment to pass. 
Because the Senate by this time was highly institutionalized, bristling with norms and traditions, 
rules and procedures,313 Mr. Allison as leader of the Republican Party in the Senate exerted 
disproportionate influence to the extreme – as did his strong distaste for direct elections. With 
Republicans firmly in control of the government by 1897, Allison became Chairman of his party’s 
caucus. More than any other leader of his time, scholars have noted, Allison strengthened partisan 
control of the Senate’s agenda.314 He took on the chair of the powerful Republican steering 
committee, a post not previously held by a caucus leader. This panel determined committee 
assignments and decided which bills would reach the Senate floor and in what order. By ending the 
practice of the rotating membership of the steering committee at the end of each Congress, Mr. 
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Allison was able to appoint the same men each session. He pre-selected committee members so as to 
control those who by seniority would chair the key committees.315 
In addition, Mr. Allison chaired the Appropriations Committee and ranked number two on 
the influential Finance Committee. His closest associates were the chairs of the other major 
committees, including Rules, Commerce, Judiciary, and Naval Affairs.316 By appointing chairs and 
members of the committees, Allison had the privilege of orchestrating committees highly unlikely to 
support a direct elections amendment – a prerogative Allison exploited. Except for two years of 
Democratic control, Allison led Republicans in the Senate and chaired the Appropriations Committee 
from 1881 until his death in 1908.317 He died a few months short of his eightieth birthday. He had 
served three decades in the U.S. Senate.   
A second member of ‘The Four’, Mr. Nelson Aldrich, has been called by scholars ‘one of the 
most powerful senators to ever serve.’318 First elected to the Senate in 1881, Aldrich also served in 
the Upper Chamber for a record-tying thirty years. With Allison, Aldrich firmly maintained 
reactionary conservatism in the Senate, by dispensing rewards, promoting friends, and isolating 
enemies.319 These two men controlled the fate of many bills, and for years the prospects of the 
Seventeenth Amendment, through their ability to enforce voting discipline.320  
Allison and Aldrich led ‘The Four’, who met regularly outside business hours for politics and 
poker; by 1901, ‘The Four’ were practically unchallenged in the Senate.321 With Mr. John Spooner of 
Wisconsin and Mr. Orville Platt of Connecticut, they determined Senate scheduling, polices in party 
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caucuses, and committee assignments.322 At the turn of the century, therefore, the Senate featured 
highly centralized leadership with unprecedented partisan decision making.323  
This all came crumbling down with Mr. Allison’s death in 1908. His replacement, Mr. 
Cummins, was very progressive.324 Thus, after electing an extremely conservative incumbent since 
1878, the Iowa Legislature recapitulated with a man who was the antithesis to all that Allison 
represented. Shortly after Allison’s death, Mr. Aldrich confirmed in November 1908 the long rumor 
that he would be stepping down at the end of his present term two years hence. ‘He has been telling 
his friends that he is entitled to rest and means to have it’, the New York Times reported on a front-
page article.325 Mr. Orville Platt passed away three years earlier, and Mr. John Spooner, ‘seeing the 
handwriting on the wall’, reported the New York Times, retired shortly before passing away in 
1907.326 Even though Mr. Aldrich stayed in the Senate until March of 1911, he was not in the Upper 
Chamber when the Seventeenth Amendment finally passed in mid-June. And during the injection of 
the race issue, Mr. Aldrich was frequently absent – ‘in the South for his health’.327  
It was once said about ‘The Four’, and in particular Mr. Aldrich and Mr. Allison, that ‘no 
man dared dispute with them on the floor of the Senate, and there was never a word from [their] 
party followers in criticism or opposition.’328 In three quick years, from 1908 to 1911, these words 
reflected the memory of one man and the bated breath of another. Not coincidentally, the three other 
critical factors – the Lorimer scandal, collaboration of governors, and race issue – propelled officials 
to reconsider the wisdom of passing a direct elections amendment for U.S. senators. This last critical 
factor ensured that the Senate itself, long characterized by hierarchical control, would have the 
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institutional capacity to pass the amendment. It was only in 1911, for instance, after the Old Lights 
had been darkened, that Mr. Borah of Idaho succeeded at last to have the Seventeenth Amendment 
referred to the Committee on Judiciary; before that time, all such resolution had been smothered by 
the Committee on Privileges and Election.329 Once it had passed this hurdle, the amendment’s 
passage was foreseen. 
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Section VI:       The Progressive Era 
(National Convention and Other Amendments) 
 
 
 
This section demonstrates that the four factors discussed above were of overriding 
importance only within a political environment ripe for reform. Political, economic, and social 
dynamics combined at the turn of the century to earn the period the epithet, the Progressive Era. 
Other demands, such as bills for the abolition of the Electoral College, were just as virulent as the 
call for direct election of senators at this time. Many observers called for an unprecedented national 
convention to accomplish these and other objectives. In the context of these demands, the Senate 
preempted calls for a convention by being the first institution to pass the Seventeenth Amendment. 
The section’s purpose, again, is to emphasize contingency in the passing of the resolution.  
Progressivism had its greatest momentum and gained its most important victories between 
1897 and 1917. One significant influence was that of Populism, a short-lived political phenomenon 
in the mid-1890s, whereby farmers mobilized against corporate wealth and monopolies. Another 
element sparking Progressivism was the growing familiarity and apparent success of Europe’s 
experiments with socialism. England’s New Liberalism, in particular, with its health acts, laws for 
housing, social security, accident compensation, and old age pensions, was regarded as an exemplary 
model.330 By the turn of the century, the Old Guard, symbolized by Mr. Allison and Mr. Aldrich, was 
already giving way to men who were more responsive to broader segments of a rapidly 
industrializing society.331 The country was moving in a direction of national unity, largely thanks to 
economic growth. In the past few years, the Wall Street Journal noted, ‘State authority to a degree 
had broken down, while the power of the central government at Washington has largely increased.’332 
These societal changes were encapsulated by President Roosevelt’s inauguration, a time scholars say 
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that sparked one of the ‘greatest periods of reform in the nation’s history.’333 Roosevelt conceived of 
himself as ‘the steward of the people’ and believed it was his duty to undertake any action in the best 
interest of the country.334 
Even though the Progressive Era had begun for years, a notable change in the country 
occurred in 1909, when ‘domestic reform came to be the dominant issue in national politics.’335 A 
large reason for this shift stemmed from Republican impotence on the economy and the positive 
consequences this had for progressives. The Depression of 1907 had not lifted with the passage of the 
1909 tariff. Just as Republican had taken credit for the prosperity which blessed the decade following 
the Dingley Act of 1897, they now received the blame for the rising cost of living.336 Conservatism 
was further impaired by internal divisiveness, as Republicans lacked national leaders to keep down 
an insurgent revolt beginning to assume serious proportions.337 Known for protecting the people 
against the ‘rule of the few’ and ‘higher prices’, insurgents capitalized on Republican discord to reap 
major electoral success in the election of 1910.338 The new Congress featured tremendous change. In 
the House, the Republican majority of 221 was reduced to a minority of 165. In the Senate, the 
Republican majority of 60 shrank to a ratio of 51 Republicans and 42 Democrats.339 Those defeated 
in the Republican Party were mainly regular Republicans, and the leadership responded by giving 
progressives better assignments.340 For the first time a Socialist took a seat in the House.341 
 But just because the composition of Congress changed did not mean that the Founding 
Fathers’ principle of indirect elections of U.S. senators was doomed. Other demands for 
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Constitutional reforms were just as vociferous as those for direct elections. To demonstrate by way of 
negative example the importance of the four critical factors discussed above, I will briefly show that 
a great breadth of public and official support existed for making other major changes to the 
Constitution, from the mundane (delaying Inauguration Day until April) to the expected (lengthening 
the presidency to a six-year term), and to the more radical (abolishing the U.S. Senate as an entity). 
Most of the proposed changes did not occur at all, and if they did, it was at a much later date. 
 Some prominent spokesmen advocated the utter abolition of the U.S. Senate. The demand for 
abolition was less frequently heard than the stimulus for direct elections but still occasionally 
voiced.342 A New York Times article from 1893 explained that the Senate’s demise has ‘provoked 
agitation for its utter abolition.’343 A Wall Street Journal article from 1908 indicated the equal 
potential for either abolition or a direct elections amendment. An example of the democratization of 
the country, the article noted, ‘can be seen in the proposal to abolish the Senate or to establish direct 
elections.’344 As late as 1911, the Socialist Victor Berger of Wisconsin proposed an amendment to 
abolish the U.S. Senate.345 Lessons drawn from the British example and the potential for the 
dissolution of the House of Lords made abolition of the Upper Chamber less unlikely.346 ‘The House 
of Lords might be wiped out in the not-too-distant future’, predicted the Forum periodical in 1893.347 
‘The abolition of the House of Lords has been in the air for decades’, observed the Wall Street 
Journal in 1906.348 Onlookers dubbed the Senate ‘the American House of Lords’ in this context.349 
 Not only was Congress at the turn of the century proposing a host of amendments, but the 
states themselves were contemplating an unprecedented national convention to assert their demands 
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independently of a Congressional joint resolution.350 In 1899, Pennsylvania created somewhat of a 
sensation by providing for the appointment of a joint committee to confer with the legislatures of 
other states to test the popularity of the notion. The committee reported that the objective could 
ultimately be accomplished.351 The idea of an unprecedented convention was ‘popular everywhere 
throughout the country, except the U.S. Senate’, reported the Los Angeles Times in 1906. Some in the 
Senate, including Mr. Heyburn, worried that this convocation of legislatures ‘would rewrite the entire 
Constitution of the United States.’352 The Los Angeles Times in 1911 noted that if a national 
convention ‘shall be called, it may do away with the Constitution of the Founding Fathers all 
together.’353 These observations reflect the sign of the times: great change was in the air at the turn of 
the century. The Seventeenth Amendment as passed by the Senate (with language reserving the 
supervision of elections to the federal government) was certainly not inevitable. 
It was widely believed that a national convention in 1911 would not limit its action to one 
amendment. As critics noted, ‘it may take into consideration a nation-wide marriage and divorce 
laws, women’s suffrage, or a rescission of the Fifteenth Amendment.’354 It was widely agreed that 
New York and the Midwestern states might combine with the Southern states to overturn the 
Fifteenth Amendment, in particular.355 A national convention also held the prospects of changing the 
number of U.S. senators, and making allotments based on population. The potential for such changes 
was significant and must be taken into account. By 1911, 29 state legislatures had voted in favor of a 
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national convention. It two more state legislatures joined in the effort, a national convention would 
have resulted.356 ‘The day of radicalism is at full dawn’, the Los Angeles Times reported.357 
 In the early 1890s, Constitutional amendments for reforming or abolishing the Electoral 
College gained traction. In 1893 Representative Springer proposed that if two leading presidential 
candidates are tied after electors cast their votes, the one having the larger popular vote ought to be 
declared the winner.358 That same year, Senator Stephen White of California came out in vigorous 
support of abolishing the Electoral College. ‘I believe that the dummy names on the electoral tickets 
should be eliminated and that the president should be elected by the direct vote by Congressional 
districts’, he declared.359 The plan for abolition was formally proposed in Congress in 1896 by Mr. 
William Springer.360 In the 63rd Congress, Representative Hobson proposed yet another amendment 
to elect the president by popular vote.361 Former President Theodore Roosevelt declared himself in 
favor of abolishing the Electoral College.362 
  Other officials in Congress at the turn of the century sought to amend the Constitution in 
regard to the Executive as well as Congress. Senator Harris of Kansas proposed an amendment 
extending the term of the presidency to six years, with no chance of reelection, and altering the terms 
of Representatives from two to four years.363 The 62nd Congress (1911-1912) considered a similar 
amendment: a resolution presented by Senator Cummins of Iowa providing for the fixed terms of the 
president and vice-president to six years. The New York Times predicted that if the Senate passed the 
measure, it would be passed by the House and probably the states.364 Indeed, the Senate Judiciary 
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Committee reported itself overwhelmingly in favor of the amendment, in large part to prevent former 
President Roosevelt from serving further as chief executive.365 In 1911, President Taft boldly 
declared himself in favor of the plan. The Los Angeles Times endorsed the change by positively 
portraying the experience of other governments with approximate terms: ‘The Argentine Republic 
elects the President for six years… France elects her president for a seven-year term… Mexico has a 
six year term… In Chile the President is elected to five years… Columbia has a six year term... In 
Haiti, a seven year term.’366  The article concluded that the American government should impose 
similar term lengths. 
 Other proposals for amendments fundamentally affecting the mechanics of government 
gained momentum at this time. Senator Owen of Oklahoma proposed an amendment in 1911 to make 
Justices of the Supreme Court subject to election recalls. ‘I say that the time has come for the 
exercise of the recall on the Supreme bench of the United States’, he declared.367 Another senator, 
Mr. Crawdord of South Dakota, proposed an amendment to fix the terms of judges of the inferior 
federal courts at ten years; the states were widely believed to be in support of the proposal.368 That 
same year, Mr. Sean Gailinger proposed an amendment (proposed several times before) aimed at 
moving back the inauguration date of the president to the last Thursday in April. The latest 
motivation stemmed from thousands of dollars lost from the President Taft’s inauguration, when 
‘grandstands… were occupied only by snowdrifts.’369  
 These competing amendments in the Progressive Era are instructive to the timing of the 
Seventeenth Amendment. Notably, Senator White’s proposal for presidential elections based on 
popular vote in 1896 failed, as did Theodore Roosevelt’s calls for the abolition of the Electoral 
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College years later. The Senate also opted to lay aside Mr. Gailinger’s proposal to inaugurate the 
president in April, and Senator Owen’s initiative to subject Supreme Court Justices to popular recall. 
A national marriage and divorce amendment was not written into the Constitution, nor was the 
Fifteenth Amendment rescinded. Up to the eve of the Senate’s about-face, mainstream media 
continued to report that an unprecedented national convention may yet transpire. By January of 1911, 
29 state legislatures had voted in favor of such a convention; if only two more states had joined, a 
convention would have occurred.370 In retrospect, the country would have to wait another twenty-two 
years until a convention convened to pass the Twenty-First Amendment repealing Prohibition. The 
Senate preempted the demand for a national convention by unexpectedly passing the Seventeenth 
Amendment, thereby supporting a measure public opinion had long endorsed. The resolution still had 
to pass the House and state legislatures, however. Twenty-four months of cloakroom bargaining and 
unforeseen, eccentric developments lay ahead.  
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Section VII:       Conclusion:  
(Path to Final Ratification and Lessons) 
 
 
 
Following the Senate’s historic vote on popular elections, there stood ‘a few lions in the path 
to the Constitutional amendment’ before it could be formally ratified.371 It had to gain support of 
two-thirds of the House and three-quarters of the states. It proved much more difficult to get by the 
House than expected, and encountered peculiarities in the state legislature rarely, if ever, seen with 
other Constitutional amendments. As the rest of the thesis has demonstrated, events overlooked by 
existing scholarship had a major impact on the amendment’s timing. 
The House supported a direct elections amendment but not in the language the Senate had 
endorsed. The temper of the majority was so decidedly against the ‘obnoxious’ Bristow measure that 
the resolution was ‘messaged back’ to the Senate – ‘without a word of explanation’ from House 
officials.372 ‘Democrats in the House are practically as a unit in opposition to the Bristow 
amendment’, explained Speaker Clark.373 By a vote of 172 to 112, the House on June 21, 1911, 
defeated the Seventeenth Amendment.374 It would take the House two more votes and many months 
before a super-majority could be obtained; the second attempt, like the first, was refused on the 
theory that the Bristow resolution would interfere with the sovereignty of states.375  
Exactly eleven months after it was reported in the morning papers that the Senate passed the 
resolution, the House of Representatives ratified the Seventeenth Amendment in an overwhelming 
vote of 237 to 39 on May 13, 1912. The intransigent majority opposed to the Bristow resolution was 
finally overcome due to internal bargaining. Based on my research, it seems that a conference 
between Senator Clark, Chairman Henry of the Rules Committee, Chairman Rucker of the committee 
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in charge of the bill, and Secretary of State William J. Bryan came to a compromise that ‘while the 
joint resolution as amended by the Senate is not all Democrats desired, it would be better to accept 
what they could get than sacrifice the whole movement.’376 Just as Woodrow Wilson and other 
governors pressured state legislatures to more actively support direct elections, William J. Bryan was 
instrumental up until the very end forcing the question to the forefront. The New York Times 
celebrated the House’s vote with the front-page byline: ‘The long fight which began in 1826, for an 
amendment to the Constitution, providing for popular election of U.S. senators, is nearer success 
tonight than ever before in the country’s history.’377 
An unusual twist of events further delayed the amendment when it was presented to the 
states. Thirty-six states, or three-quarters of the union, were needed to ratify the amendment. By 
November 1912, six months after the House’s vote, only two states, Massachusetts and Minnesota, 
had voted to adopt the measure. The failure of other states to act was due to fact that few other 
legislatures were in session since the late spring.378 The New Year brought a rush of states to sign on, 
with Pennsylvania being the thirty-fifth state to ratify the amendment.  
In April of 1913, an embarrassing mistake in the Wisconsin Legislature led to the mistaken 
impression across the nation that that the Seventeenth Amendment had been ratified when, in fact, it 
had not. ‘No direct elections yet’, warned the New York Times.379 The state legislature had 
accidentally voted on ‘a wrong copy’ of the draft, invalidating ratification for the time being; it was 
not known how state senator Ackerley who introduced the amendment came into the possession of an 
incorrect copy.380 Another state – Connecticut – would ultimately save the measure on April 8, 
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1913.381 Although this ratification process was not slow by the standards of other amendments, 
additional unusual features affected its incorporation into the Constitution. Delay, for instance, 
occurred because of ‘the apparent apathy’ of officials in the ratifying states.382 Although press reports 
indicated thirty-five states had adopted the amendment by April 6, the State Department had received 
the returns from only twenty-two of them at that time. Thus, more than three weeks after the 
amendment had been formally ratified, the amendment still lacked legal authority because South 
Dakota had not yet ‘notified’ the state department.383 Thus, idiosyncrasies in both the Wisconsin and 
South Dakota Legislatures affected the timing of the amendment, notions never before raised in 
published material. It would take six weeks after the thirty-sixth state, Connecticut, had ratified the 
amendment before it became authoritative on May 31, 1913. 
 While scholars have long implied that the amendment was a fait accompli by virtue of its 
date in the Progressive Era, I do not believe onlookers themselves felt the Seventeenth Amendment 
was foreseen six months before its passage. And its ratification did not spring merely because there 
were more progressives and insurgents in the U.S. Senate either, as some scholars have argued. Other 
important reforms, such as calls for extending the term of the presidency and abolishing the Electoral 
College, were repressed. These equally responsible measures were eschewed; the Seventeenth 
Amendment was not. 
Two examples from Constitutional history tell us, I believe, why timing for an amendment is 
crucial to understand. The first involves the Thirteenth Amendment, which abolished slavery and did 
not occur until after the Civil War. Its timing, clearly, had enormous implications: to the millions of 
slaves still living under its yoke, the fact that it happened in 1866 instead of 1867, 1868, or 1890 was 
surely not unimportant. Even if one were to assume that slavery contained the germ of death as an 
                                                 
381
 The Connecticut General Assembly, by a vote of 159 to 77, passed the resolution; it was unanimously 
passed by the Connecticut Senate. ‘Direct Election of Senators’, Wall Street Journal, April 9, 1913 p. 6.  
382
 ‘Delay Direct Vote Notice’, New York Times, April 6, 1913 p. C6. 
383
 ‘Waiting on South Dakota’, Los Angeles Times, April 28, 1913 p. 3. 
 78 
institution, it took a rapid cascade of critical factors in a short time span to bring about national 
manumission, including Lincoln’s inauguration, the Fort Sumter attack igniting war, and the 
Emancipation Proclamation.384 Similarly, even if the Seventeenth Amendment was destined to occur 
(which it was not), its ratification required a burst of energy that its previous momentum lacked. 
A second example involves the Twenty-third Amendment (1961) that slightly altered the 
Electoral College, extending representation to the District of Columbia. Lyndon B. Johnson in 1964 
was therefore elected by a different electoral procedure than John F. Kennedy in 1960, but neither 
was elected by popular vote. However, it is not difficult to think of a scenario whereby the Electoral 
College itself would have been abolished, especially if a few critical factors had coalesced during the 
Progressive Era – at a time, for instance, when Senator Stephen White proposed his amendment. 
Maybe a large executive scandal, like that on the level of Mr. Lorimer, would have been sufficient to 
abolish the Electoral College. Perhaps a vigorous campaign from governors could have forced the 
Senate’s hand, or maybe if the states had devised laws to give the electorate the popular vote, an 
amendment would have been seen as necessary to end controversial, local problems needing national 
solutions. Alas, these factors did not occur, and Al Gore in 2000, for instance, lost an election he may 
have won had it been for the absence of a few historical factors occurring along a divergent 
trajectory. 
 Why things happen when they do is difficult to resolve when one is dealing with years of 
data describing diverse individuals, laws, institutions, and concepts, such as public opinion. This 
thesis has tried to focus the spotlight on the short dawn preceding the direct elections amendment. It 
has done so by taking a top-down perspective, focusing on the Senate, especially institutional factors 
affecting the timing of its passage, namely ‘killer amendments’. I have sought to explain in my best 
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judgment why the amendment occurred when it did. Four critical factors – Mr. Lorimer’s scandal, a 
campaign to end ineffective state primary laws, a divisive race issue, and the death of Mr. Allison 
and retirement of Mr. Aldrich –transpired from 1908 to 1911. These factors are far and away the 
most compelling stimuli underlying the amendment’s passage. No published material has explored 
the timing of the Seventeenth Amendment comprehensively, let alone these specific factors. 
Scholarship has identified justifications, but has mostly concentrated on the amendment’s effects, not 
its origins, and has not appreciated the four factors I describe, or done so by the methods or within 
the framework that I have. Significantly, these factors occurred in the Progressive Era, but this era by 
itself did not guarantee the Seventeenth Amendment. 
The common denominator of the critical factors described in this thesis is that they all 
occurred in a short time span, were unexpected and unmatched in intensity, and turned the issue into 
a question of national urgency. Here, certainly, was a cascade of events that qualifies as a sine qua 
non – the essential condition, the absolute prerequisite of the Seventeenth Amendment, and the very 
things without which the measure would not have happened at all, or certainly not near the date when 
it did occur. It is ironic therefore that the secondary literature focuses on the long history of agitation 
motivating reform, when the Seventeenth Amendment came about literally from a very short and 
unexpected framing of events. In 1891, a forward-looking article on direct elections graced the New 
York Times: ‘Although the demand appears to be increasing, it is likely to be a long time before it 
acquires sufficient force.’385 That force came not in the early 1890s, as Riker states when he says 
public discontent reached its high mark; not in 1906 as Bybee indicates by pointing to muckraking 
journalism, but over the next several years. It was only at this time that sufficient numbers of officials 
sought to implement, and had the first real chance to institute, the noble-minded change. 
The Seventeenth Amendment was officially signed into effect on May 31, 1913, an occasion 
of considerable ceremony. Secretary of State William J. Bryan signed his signature to the document 
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promulgating the amendment with four silver pens. One was tied with a red ribbon, another with a 
white ribbon, the third with blue, and the fourth with two white ribbons. Bryan signed his first name 
with the red-ribboned pen. He took the white-ribboned pen and signed Jennings. With the blue-
ribboned pen he signed Bryan and handed it to his wife. With the double-white-ribboned pen he 
wrote the thirty-first and handed it to Senator Borah. ‘That marks the end of a long fight,’ said Bryan. 
‘Yes’, replied Senator Borah.386 The signature and date took three minutes. Began in 1826, the long 
fight had finally come to an end, the last word being blotted at 11:16 am. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THE END 
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Appendix 
 
 
 
 I would like to thank my thesis adviser, Professor John Lapinski, for his ongoing and kind 
support over the past year. His guidance was everything I could have possibly hoped for and more. In 
writing this thesis, it reminded me how far I have come from my days as a first-year undergraduate, 
and it seems appropriate to thank the University of Pennsylvania as a whole, and especially the 
Political Science Department, for contributing primarily for my academic growth.  
 For purposes of future research, I would like to explain the trajectory I followed in compiling 
the primary research for this project. I began by reading every book and scholarly article I could find 
on the Seventeenth Amendment, and then researched corollaries of the amendment, including the 
Progressive Era, Congressional History, and Populism. At this time, I decided that the thrust of my 
project would come from researching contemporary newspaper articles, which I compiled and 
analyzed through the use of Proquest, a database of prominent newspapers and periodicals. 
 I developed and put to practice a systematic approach to sift through millions of digital pages, 
a process which consumed the majority of my research over the past eight months. For every year 
between 1890 and 1913, I typed in various ‘key words’ relevant to the Seventeenth Amendment, 
downloaded the article, saved it as a pdf if relevant – all to ensure that I was not missing a possibly 
germane article by searching for a topic that did not strike an immediate response from the search 
interface. These key words consisted of seven different types: ‘Direct Elections’, ‘Seventeenth 
Amendment’, ‘Constitutional Amendment and Senate’, ‘Popular Vote for Senators’, ‘Corruption and 
Senate’, ‘Bribery and Senate’, and ‘Senate and Deadlock’. Sometimes these searches yielded bizarre 
returns, such as an upsetting story that appeared after researching amendments in 1903, about a six-
year-old boy who ate canned salmon and was believed to have died of ptomaine poisoning.387 For the 
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most part, the process worked as expeditiously as I could have hoped, and I saved and read no fewer 
than 1,400 articles. Below is a table summarizing the data for two of the years researched in this 
thesis; notice the disparity between the numbers of article hits in 1890 and 1910.   
 
Searches 1890 1910 
‘Direct Elections’ 0 8 
‘Seventeenth Amendment’ 0 0 
‘Constitutional Amendment and 
Senate’ 
2 12 
‘Popular Vote for Senators’ 20 45 
‘Corruption and Senate’ 16 125 
‘Bribery and Senate’ 15 171 
‘Senate and Deadlock’ 0 10 
 
 
 While reviewing the agglomeration of data, I noticed a major fallacy in the existing 
scholarship: the tendency to ignore factors that were the sina qua non of the Seventeenth 
Amendment’s passage. I thereafter synthesized my notes into various sections, from ‘race and 
Bristow resolution’ to ‘Founding Fathers’, ‘William J. Bryan’, ‘Senator Allison’s death’, and 
‘Governors’. By thinking about these articles in conjunction with the secondary literature, I 
developed in my best judgment the reasons that Seventeenth Amendment passed when it did, a story 
that I discovered was in no small part defined by the U.S. Senate’s handling of the stimulus.  
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